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INTRODUCTION
The best-known proofs for the existence of God are the
classic Quinque Viae, most carefully developed by St. Thomas
Aquinas.

However, these proofs do not represent the only

efforts of thinkers to arrive at so important a fact.

The

proof from the universal consent of mankind found wide .favor
among the Fathers of the Church.

st. Anselm attempted an

approach through our concept of God.

Other men, philosophers

and theologians, have made other efforts.

It is our purpose

in this paper to discuss one such effort.

We seek to record,

to appreciate, and to criticize what may be called the
psychological proof for the existence of God advanced by St.
Augustine, Bishop of Hippo.
It is true that the elements of all the classic proofs
are to be found in St. Augustine.

It is true that he attached

special importance to the proof from the consent of the human
race.

But the argument which he developed most fully and

most carefully is this psychological proof.

We may profitably

study this argument, not only because it may be a Sixth Way
to prove God's existence, but because, as cayre says, "The
1

2

idea of God is the central point in Augustine's thought."l
Examining this argument, we may learn much of the method and
the thought of this great Doctor.

For, although he considered

a proof for God's existence one of the easiest of tasks, and
although he thought that those who are ignorant of God's
existence must be very few in number; nevertheless, he
systematically worked out this proof from reason.
our task, then, will be to record as faithfully as
possible the route taken by st. Augustine.

First, we will

trace out the argument as it appears in fullest form, in the
De Libera Arbitrio.

Then we will follow the same itinerary in

the De Vera Religione.

And yet again we will attempt to set

down the whole proof with texts drawn also from other works
than these two.

This task accomplished, we will form an

opinion with regard to the principle on which the proof is
based.

We will seek to answer the questions: Is it ontological?

Does it have an ess,ential connection with st. Augustine's
doctrine of illumination?

After criticizing the proof along

these lines and after forming a jud3IJ1ent on its validity, we
will look into its spirit, pointing out the characteristic
touches of st. Augustine of which it gives evidence.

1

F. cayre, A.A., Precis de Patrologie et d'Histoire de la
Theologie, Desclee et C!e, Paris, 193T';' I, 655: "L'wee
de Dieu est le point central de la. pensee augustinienne."

CF...APTER I
THE PROOF IN THE DE LIBERO ARBITRIO
The De Libero Arbitrio was written in Rome and Africa
between the years 388 and 395.

It is done in dialogue form:

Augustine discusses the question of evil, its nature and
particularly its source, with Evodius, a member of his household who later became Bishop of Uzala.
rather extended.

The discussion is

Although the argument we are handling occurs

in the second book, it seems well to sumn1arize the first book,
so as to give something of the context, for this procedure will
aid the understanding of the proof.
Evodius introduces the question by asking whether God is
the author of evil.

Augustine points out the distinction

between the evil that one does and the evil that one suffers;
and adds the comment that God, since He is just,l cannot be
the author of the former type.

1

Moreover, since evil-doers are

Aurelius Augustinus, De Libero Arbitrio, editor J.P. Migne,
Garnier Fratres, PariB; 1877, Book I, Chapterl, Number 1;
Patrologiae Latinae Cursus Completus, Tome 32, Column 1222:
11 ••• si Deum justum fatemur, nam et fioc negare sacrilegium
est ••• " All references to Augustine's works will be to
this edition (PL).
3

4

punished by the just God, they must be the authors of their
own evil deeds.
How then, asks Evodius, do,es man learn to commit evil
deeds?

Augustine answers that man does not learn this from any

evil teacher.

"For if he is evil, he is not a teacher; if he

is a teacher, he is not evil. 11 2

The question, therefore,

remains: Whence does it come about that we should do evil?
Augustine admits that this is a knotty problem, since
God is the author of all things that exist and yet cannot be
the author of sin.

He points out some of God's perfections:

His goodness, His omnipotence, His creative activity.
does to encourage Evodius to pursue the inquiry.

This he

"For God

will be present and will make us understand what we have
believed. 11 3

This method of calling upon God to help the

investigation and this praise of God should be underlined.

It

is a method typical of st. Augustine, and it will recur in the
second book, where the proof for the existence of God begins.
Furthermore, one should note the fact that Augustine wants to
understand what he believes by faith; that is, he wants to

2
3

Ibid., I, 1, 3·; PL 32: "Si enim malus est, doctor non
est; si doctor est, malus non est." (Col. 1223)
Ibid., I, 2, 4; PL 32, 1224: "Aderit enim Deus, et nos
intelligere quod credidimus, faciet."

5

proceed by way of reason, taking his starting point from that
which he believes by faith.

This purpose he repeats in the

next chapter: "But now we are striving to know by understanding
and to hold firmly that which we have taken on faith."4

Again

in the fourth chapter he recalls to Evodius' mind their desire
to investigate the problem by reason: "But you must recall
that we have undertaken to understand that which we believe."5
This reminder is constantly on St. Augustine's lips.

He is

endeavoring to make a philosophical investigation.
The remainder of the first book need not delay us long.
Taking up the question of the source of evil, Augustine says
that it seems to come from libido or cupiditas.

He then mulls

over some objections: first, whether killing out of fear for
one's own life is inspired by cupidity (and this leads to a
discussion of culpable cupidity); secondly, whether the
homicide permitted by law, as in a just war or to defend one's
virtue or to protect one's life against an unjust attacker,
can be traced to cupidity.

Evodius' reply includes a dis-

tinction between man-made law and the divine law.

This

distinction Augustine takes up for the purpose of showing that

4
5

Ibid., I, 3, 6; PL 32, 1225: "Sed nunc molimur id quod in
1Iaem recepimus, etiam intelligendo scire ac tenere
firmissimum."
Ibid., I, 4, 10; PL 02, 1226: "Sed meminisse te oportet id
a nobis susceptum, ut intelligamus quod credimus. 11

mmc

........

6

man-made law is temporal and mutable, whereas the divine law
is eternal and immutable and the norm according to which manmade laws are to be judged.6
Since the divine law states that it is proper that all
things be well-ordered, man must be ordered properly in
himself.

But the highest faculty in man is his reason.

There-

fore he is well-ordered in himself if everything in him is
subject to reason.

This right order is true wisdom; lack of

it marks the foolish man.
st. Augustine has now begun to speak more directly of
his principal subject, free will.

He continues.

No mind can

be forced to the service of cupidity, because cupidity of
itself is not stronger than the mind.

Consequently, the man

who has forsaken wisdom to serve his cupidity is justly
punished.

He has indulged his own will.

F~s

punishment here

consists in the errors, wanderings, and stupid decisions into
which he falls.

Moreover, he rightly suffers the loss of

eternal life, because he has willingly taken up the service of
cupidity which he could have refused.
This idea Augustine repeats again and again in chapters
12-15 of the first book, in which he answers objections,
amplifies and illustrates his proof, points out some of its

6

Ibid., I, 6, 15; PL 32, 1229.

7

consequences.

In chapter 16 he presents a summary of the

argument given:
Quocirca licet nunc animadvertere et
considerare, utrum sit aliud male
facere, quam neglectis rebus aeternis,
quibus per seipsam mens fruitur, et
per seipsam percipi t, et quas amana ami·ttere
non potest, temporalia et quae per corpus
hominis partem vilissimam. sentiuntur, et
numquam esse certa possunt, quasi magna
et miranda sectari.7
Evodius agrees that they have indeed discovered what
evil is and whence it comes; namely from man's free will.

He

is, however, disturbed by the further problem of why God
gave man free will, since man would not sin if he were not
free.
Sed quaero utrum ipsum liberum arbitrium
quo peccandi facultatem habere convincimur, oportuerit nobis dari ab eo
qui no~ fecit. Videmur enim non fuisse
peccaturi, si isto careremus; et metuandum
.est ne hoc modo Deus etiam malefactorum
nostrorum auctor existimetur.B
Augustine promises to take up, with God's help, the problems
of whether God gave us our free will and whether He ought to
have done so; but puts them off until another time.
True to his word, he does resume the discussion in the

7
8

Ibid., I, 16, 34; PL 32, 1240.
Ibid., I, 16, 35; PL 32, 1240

8

second book of the De Libero Arbitrio, the book with which we
are really concerned, inasmuch as it contains the argument
we are examining.
Evodius first returns to the attack by asking why God
gave man free will, since, if man did not possess this
faculty, he could not sin.

In answer, Augustine elicits the

fact that God made us what we are.

But it is also true that

God would not give us anything evil, anything we ought not
have.

And yet, as we have seen, it is by means of this free

will of ours that we sin; and we know (on authority) that we
are justly punished for our sins.

Augustine then gives the

preliminary response that God, by punishing man for sin,
indicates that man used his free will for another reason than
that for which it was given.

Hence he argues that the reason

for which it was given is that man might live properly.
Hence too, free will is a good and it is fitting that God
give it to man.
Evodius thereupon objects.

If God gave man free will

that he might live properly, why can it be turned aside to
evil?

Augustine replies that, if it is uncertain whether or

not God gave us this gift, we must seek to determine whether
it is a good gift: if it is, it certainly came from Him;
if not, it certainly did not come from Him.

But, says

Evodius, although I know with unshakable faith that God gave

9

us this gift; nevertheless, since by reason I am not certain
that it is a good gift, I am also uncertain by reason that
God gave it.
Ah, says Augustine, let us then begin with what we hold
for certain.

Are you certain that God exists?

Evodius

answers that he is certain with the certainty of faith.
However, he reminds Augustine of their original purpose:

"But

now we seek to know and to understand that which we believe.n9
Thereupon Augustine, agreeing that believing and understanding
are two different things, launches forth on his famous proof
for the existence of God.

First, however, he demands-faith

in God's existence, for "no one becomes capable of finding
God, unless he first believe what he is afterwards to know.nlO
This demand is, in reality, a request for good will on the part
of the listener or reader, as can be seen from a reading of
the entire chapter.
Before Augustine plunges into the problem with which we
are here concerned, he pauses for one important moment.

He

proves to Evodius, from the very fact of his existence, that
the human mind is capable of attaining truth.

9
10

Even if

Ibid., II, 2, 5; PL 32, 1243: "sed nos id quod credimus,
'i1"0'Sae et intelligere cupimus."
Ibid., II, 2, 6; PL 32, 1243: " ••• neque quisquam inveniendo
Deo fit idoneus, nisi antea crediderit quod est postea
cogniturus."

10

Evodius doubts this ability, he knows for certain that he
exists.

For one cannot doubt unless he exists.

This insistence

upon so fundamental a fact may be due to st. Augustine's
previous acquaintance with the Manichaeans, who said that man
could know nothing for certain.

At any rate, it is a point of

capital importance to be made at the outset of a proof from
reason.
continuing his plan of taking a start from that which
is held for certain, Augustine elicits from Evodius the facts
tha~

Evodius is, that he is alive, and that he has under-

standing.

Together they arrive at the conclusion that

understanding is the highest of these three.

"Tenemus etiam

id esse in his tribus praestantius, quod homo cum duobus
caeteris habet, id est intelligere, quod habentem sequitur
et esse et vivere.nll
The next step is to show--or rather merely to get
Evodius' consent--that man has five senses, each of which has
its own proper object, some of which have also a common
object.

However, in addition to these external senses, there

is a certain interior sense whose function it is to gather the
data brought in through the external senses in such a way
that the possessor seeks what is good for itself and avoids

11

Ibid., II, 3, 7; PL 32, 1244.

......

'

11
what may harm it.l2

Although this interior sense is superior

to the exterior senses,l3 it is not the reason, since it is
clear that brutes also possess it.

That it is superior to the

external senses is shown by the fact that, whereas no exterior
sense can be aware of itself, the interior sense both senses
corporeal objects by means of the exterior senses and also is
aware of the sense itself.

For if it did not have this power,

if it did not sense the difference, for example, between seeing
and not seeing, how would it control the eye?

Again, if it

were not aware of its own life, how would it flee from what is
harmful to that life?

All this, however, can be explained on

the sense level.l4
Of course a difficulty at once arises: if all this can
be explained on the sense level, how can the interior sense
be called superior to the exterior senses?

Here Augustine,

recognizing the difficulty, pauses to recapitulate, to give
his argument in a different way, and to lay down a principle
which is of the first importance in his proof.
It is true that both the exterior senses and the interior
sense must be placed in the class of things which exist and are

12
13
14

Ibid., II, 3, 8; PL 32, 1244: " ••• ille autem intus in
ipsa anima."
Ibid.: " ••• omnibus communiter praesidet."
Ibid., II, 4, 10; PL 32, 1246.

12
alive.

It is also true that this interior sense is not reason,

for it does not understand.

Can we say, then, that it is

superior to the exterior senses in that it has these senses as
its object?

This is not a criterion, since the object of

sense--or of intelligence, for that matter--is not, simply
because it is the object, inferior to the subject.
c.an our criterion be?

It is this.

vVhat, then,

Just as the bodily senses

in some way (quodam111odo} "judge" their object, so the interior
sense "judges" and "advises" the exterior senses, recognizing
and seeking what they need, directing them to action.

Since

that which judges about something is superior to that which is
judged, the interior sense excels the exterior senses.

This

important principle is stated clearly in the last sentence
of the following significant quotation.
Quia moderatorem et judicem querndam
hujus ~he exterior sens~ illum
[interior sense~ esse cognosce. Nam
et si quid huic1:l.n officio defuerit,
ille tamquam debitum a ministro
flagitat, sicut paulo ante disputatum
est~
Non enim se videre, aut non
vider·e sensus oculi videt, et quia
non videt, non potest quid sibi
desit, aut quid satis sit judicare;
sed ille interior, quo a&nonetur et
anima bestiae aperire oculum clausum,
et quod deesse sentit implere. Nulli
autem dubium est eum qui judicat, eo
de quo judicat esse meliorem.l5

15

Ibid., II, 5, 12; PL 32, 1247.
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Making use of the principle, Augustine ascends higher
in the hierarchy of beings.

Reason in man is clearly seen to

be above external corporeal objects, the exterior senses, and
the interior sense.

.F'or as the exterior sense in some way

judges its object, and as the interior sense in some way judges
the exterior senses, so reason in the strictest sense judges
all these things.

In fact, this principle gives justification

to the original hierarchy which Augustine and Evodius had
employed, namely,

~'

vivere, intelligere; because living

beings judge non-living beings and intelligent beings judge
irrational beings, both living and non-living.

Hereupon, they

come to the conclusion that nothing in man is superior to
reason.l6
Now that this point has been philosophically established
to Evodius' satisfaction, Augustine rather surprisingly asks
whether Evodius will be willing to admit that God exists if
only it is proved to him that something exists superior to
man's intellect.

Evodius is at first unwilling to grant this;

for, he says, this being might still be inferior to God.
Augustine then asks if Evodius is willing to admit that an
external and immutable being--if such can be proved to exist

16

Ibid., II, 6, 13; PL 32, 1248: "A. Quare vide, obsecro,
utrum aliquid invenire possis, quod sit in natura hominis
ratione sublimius. E. Nihil omnino melius video."

14
above our intellects--is God, for corporeal beings and the
senses and reason itself are all subject to change.
grants this.

Evodius

Then Augustine promises to demonstrate that an

eternal, immutable being does exist aoove our intellect and
that either this being is God, or, if some being is superior,
this latter is God.l7

In any case, once he has shown that this

being superior to our intellects does exist, he will have shown
that God exists.

This will be the course the remainder of

the proof will take.
A pause here is in order that three important statements
may be given proper attention.

The first is that the principle

to be used in determining one being's superiority to another
is that that which
judges.

j~dges

is superior to that about which it

The second is the insistence upon God's immutability.·

"Sed, quaeso te, si non inveneris esse aliquid supra nostram
rationem, nisi quod aeternum et incommutabile est, dubitabisne
hunc Deum dicereoznl8

The third is, again, that the proof is

to proceed by way of reason, that is, it is to be philosophical.
Quae si nullo adhibito corporis instrumento,
neque per tactum, neque per gustatum,

17

18

Ibid., II, 6, 14; PL 32, 1248: 11 Bene habet, nam mihi satis
err! ostendere esse aliquid hujusmodi, quod aut fateberis
Deum esse, aut si aliquid supra est, eum ips~ Deum esse
concedes. Quare sive supra sit aliquid, sive non sit,
manifestum erit Deum esse, cum ego, quod promisi, esse supra
rationem, eodem ipso adjuvants monstravero."
~., II, 6, 14; PL 32, 1248.

15
neque per olfactum, neque per aures, neque
per oculos, neque per ullum sensum se
inferiorem, sed per seipsam [ratio} cerni t
aeternum aliquid-et incommutabile, simul
et seipsam inferiorem, et illum oportet Deum
suum esse fateatur.l9
The next step in the proof for the existence of God is
begun by an analogy.

Our senses and our reason belong to us

alone; we do not all share, for example, in one great sense of
hearing.

Augustine's sense of hearing is distinct from that

of Evodius.

However, the objects of sense are, in varying

degrees, the common property of all.

For, although two men

tasting the same honey cannot taste the identically same portio
of' that honey; nevertheless, the same sound can at the same
time be heard by all in its vicinity.

Some objects of sense,

therefore, are not changed by being perceived by the senses;
hence, they do not belbng to the nature of the sense but are
rather common property.
Proprium ergo et quasi privatum intelligendum
est, quod unicuique nostrum soli est, et
quod in se solus sentit, quod ad suam naturam
pertinet: commune autem et quasi publicum,
quod ab omnibus sentientibus nulla sui
corruptione atque commutatione sentitur.20
The point of the analogy is this: just as there are some
objects which can, while remaining unchanged in themselves,

19
20

Ibid., II, 6, 14; PL 32, 1248.
Ibid., II, 7, 19; PL 32, 1251.

Italics mine.

,... ------------------------------------------------------.
16

be perceived by the senses, and which are common to all
sentient beings perceiving them; so there will be an object or
objects of the reason which can be perceived by all intelligent
beings and yet be in no wise changed by the fact that they
are intellectually perceived.
Is there some being which every intelligent being apprebends by his reason alone and which, whether apprehended or
not, remains one and unchangeable?

One such being is number.

since number is built up of unity, it cannot be perceived by
the senses.

For the senses perceive only bodies, all of which

are made up of innumerable parts.

Moreover, the laws of number

are eternally true and immutable; for example, " ••• quotus
quisque numerus est ab ipso principio, totus post 1llum sit
duplus ejus.n21

Finally, these laws are common to all who have

understanding, but remain true whether or not they are
rationally apprehended.

Hence, we have established the fact

that number is one of the kind of being we are seeking.22
It occurs to Augustine that number and wisdom are joined
together in Ecclesiasticus: "Circuivi ego et cor meum, ut

21
22

Ibid., II, 8, 23; PL 32, 1253.
f'51"Q., II, 8, 24; PL 32, 1253: "His et talibus multis

documentis coguntur fateri, quibus disputantibus Deus
donavit ingenium, et pertinacia caliginum non obducit,
rationem veritatemque numerorum et ad sensus corporis non
pertinere, et invertibilem sinceramque consistere, et
omnbus ratiocinantibus ad videndum ease communem."

Jill'"'"

----------------------------------------------------------------------,
17
scirem et considerarem, et quaererem sapientiam et numerum."
Hence he investigates wisdom to determine whether or not it
too is the kind of being he is trying to find above the
intellect.
In the first place he wants to know if wisdom is common
to all men.

It would seem not, says Evodius, for different

men consider themselves wise while engaging in very different
enterprises: the military art, business, philosophy, etc.
Augustine points out that wisdom is the truth in which the
supreme Good is perceived and grasped.23

For all men seek

what appears to them as good in all that they do, even though
they are mistaken in regard to what actually is good.

But the

more men err in this respect, the less wise they are; for they
go farther from the truth in which the Supreme Good is
perceived and grasped.

They are wise in proportion as they

approach the Supreme Good which gives real happiness.24
Hence, as all men wish to be happy, all have some notion of
wisdom.

Can we now say that one wisdom is common to all

rational beings, or are there as many wisdoms as there are
intellects?

23
24

Evodius, still bothered by the fact that different

Ibid., II, 9, 26; PL 32, 1254: "Num aliam putas esse
sapientiam nisi veritatem, in qua cernitur et tenetur
summum bonum? n
Ibid.: "Et quanto magis in via vitae quis errat, tanto
minus sapit. Tanto enim magis longe est a veritate, in
qua cernitur et tenetur summum bonum."

18

men pursue different objects as their Supreme Good, is not yet
convinced that there is one wisdom; nor does the analogy with
the sun, in whose light are seen many different objects,
completely win him over.
Accordingly, Augustine gives several examples to prove
his argument.

He runs through several truths, several rules of

wisdom, upon which

~11

men agree: that the incorruptible is to

be preferred to the corruptible, that the eternal is to be
preferred to the temporal, that like things should be compared
with like.

With each new example, he asks: "These truths go

to make up wisdom and are held by all men, aren't they?"

To

each question Evodius is forced logically to answer: "Prorsus
sine dubio," "Certissimum est," or "Manifestissime."

Hence it

is clear that, just as the true and unchangeable rules of
number are common to all men, so too there are true and
unchangeable rules of wisdom common to all.25
To Evodius' inquiry whether or not wisdom and number are
the same thing, Augustine devotes some time.

25

He says that it

Ibid., II, 10, 29; PL 32, 1257: ttQuam ergo verae atque
incommutabiles aunt regulae numerorum, quorum rationem
atque veritatem incommutabiliter atque communiter omnibus
eam cernentibus, praesto esse dixisti; tam aunt verae
atque incommutabiles regulae sapientiae, de quibus paucis
nunc singillatim interrogatus respondisti esse veras
atque manifestas, easque omnibus qui haec intueri valent,
communes ad contemplandum adesse concedis."
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seems that they are different in that, while number is found
in all things, true wisdom is found only in some men.

But,

he concludes, be that as it may, the point to seize is that
both are incontrovertibly true.
Having, then, shown that wisdom is common to all men,
Augustine must show that it is immutable and that it is
superior to our minds.

It is one and common to all intelligent

beings, as we have shown, just as a sound is common to all who
are present to hear it.

It is unchangeable, as can best be seen

by some examples: eternal things always were, are, and always
will be superior to temporal; seven plus three always did make,
do make, and always make ten.

The mind also gives recognition

to this fact by immediately accepting such truths rather than
judging them.26
to our minds.

Pinally, the truth which is wisdom is superior
It is not inferior, since we do not judge it,

saying that it ought to be thus and thus; but we judge according
to it, using it as a norm.

But if it were inferior we would

judge about it, not according to it.27

It is not equal to our

minds, since it is irmnutable, whereas our minds are forever

26

27

Ibid., II, 12, 34; PL 32, 1259: "cum enim quis dixerit
aeterna temporalibus esse potiora, aut septem et tria
decem esse, nemo dicit ita esse debuisse, sed tantum ita
esse cognoscens, non examinator corrigit, sed tantum
laetatur inventor."
Ibid.: Sed si esset inferior, non secundum illam, sed de
rna judicaremus."
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changing.

Indeed, we even judge our own minds according to

the norm of this truth.28

It remains, therefore, that this

truth, this wisdom, is superior to our minds.

Consequently

we see that above our intellects there are at least
, number and
wisdom, both of which are eternal and immutable.
Instead of completing his proof immediately, Augustine
first devotes some time to the praise of wisdom.

He exhorts

Evodius to rejoice in the truth which alone suffices for
beatitude, to rejoice in it as other men rejoice in lesser
goods.

For. this truth alone can be possessed securely at

all times and in all places; it alone can be grasped wholly by
many men at the same time.

In a beautiful passage, reminiscent

,

of Cicero's praise of the liberal arts in his -Pro Arabia 29
Augustine sings the praises of this truth.
At illa veritatis et sapientiae pulchritude
tantum adsit perseverans voluntas fruendi,

28

29

Ibid., "Si autem esset aequalis mentibus nostris haec
ver!tas, mutabilis etiam ipsa esset. Mentes enim nostrae
aliquando earn plus vident, aliquando minus, et ex hoc
fatentur se esse mutabiles: cum illa in se manens nee
proficiat cum plus a nobis videtur, nee deficiat cum minus,
sed integra et incorrupta, et converses laetificet lumine,
et aversos puniat caecitate. Quid, quod etiam de ipsis
mentibus nostris secundum illam judicamus, cum de illa
nullo modo judicare possumus-..,
Marcus Tullius Cicero, Oratio pro Arabia: "Nam ceterae
neque temporum sunt neque aetatum omnium neque locorum;
at haec studia adulescentiam alunt, senectutem oblectant,
secundas res ornant, adversis perfugium ac solacium
praebent, delectant domi, non impediunt foris, pernoctant
nobiscum, peregrinantur, rusticantur."

21
nee multitudine audientium constipata
secludit venientes, nee peragitur
tempore, nee migrat locis, nee nocte
intercipitur, nee umbra intercluditur,
nee sensibus corporis subjacet. De
toto mundo ad se conversis qui diligunt
earn, omnibus proxima est, omnibus
sempiterna; nullo loco est, nusquam
deest; foris adthonet, intus docet;
cernentes se commutat omnes in melius,
a nullo in deterius commutatur; nullus
de illa judicat, nullus sine illa
judicat bene.30
·
This passage is included, not because of its literary
beauty (although that would be sufficient to justify the
insertion), but because it aptly illustrates St. Augustine's
affective method.

Augustine continually reaches out to grasp

with his will that which he has apprehended by his intellect.
True, he has insisted throughout the

~

Libero Arbitrio that

he is proceeding by way of the reason--and so he is.

However,

at the same time he is anxious to seize and possess with his
will the eternal truth at which his reason has arrived.

His

philosophizing has a practical purpose too.
To return to the argument itself, we have only to see
how St. Augustine brings it to its conclusion.
very briefly.

'rhis he does

He reminds Evodius that the latter had granted

that God's existence would be proved if it were shown at
length that some

30

b~ing

exists above our intellects, provided

Ibid., II, 14, 38; PL 32, 1262.

~------------------------------------.
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that no being is superior to this latter.

Augustine says

that he has, by demonstrating that some being does exist above
our intellects, already proved that God exists; for either this
being is itself God, or, if sone still higher being exists, this
latter is God.

In any case,

Go~

exists.

faith; now they know it by reason also.31

This they knew by
Thus is the proof

concluded.
It appears unnecessary to give what follows in the
Libero Arbitrio.

~

What preceded seemed important in order that

we might see in what context the argument was set.

But to give,

even briefly, all that follows would draw us away from our
main point.

Suffice it, therefore, to say that Augustine

proves that free will is a good thing and comes from God, that
he answers the difficulty about the will's being able to be
turned to evil, and that he discusses the nature of evil.32
The course that the proof has taken may now be given
briefly.

Beginning with a demand for faith in God's existence,

which is really an assurance of good will, Augustine proceeds
by way of reason to prove that God exists.

31
32

After he has

Ibid., II, 15, 39; PL 32, 1262: "Quod non jam solum indubi-

tat-Um, quantum arbitror, fide retinemus, sed etiam certa,

quamvis adhuc tenuissima, forma cognitionis attingimus. 11
For a well-developed summary of the entire three books of
the De Libero Arbitrio, see Vernon J. Bourke, Ph.D.,
Au~ustine's Quest of Wisdom, Bruce Publishing Company,
Mi waukee, 1945, 9!=101.
·
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proved the aptitude of the mind for truth, he takes his
start from certain, evident facts: that Evodius is, that he is
alive, that he has understanding.

Then he sets up a hierarchy

of beings in order to see if God exists at the top of this
scale.

First, there are non-living corporeal beings; then in

sentient beings the exterior senses, above which is an interior
sense; then in man comes reason, man's highest faculty.

If

above man's reason there is some immutable and eternal being,
says Augustine, then God exists.

Employing the principle he

has used all along (id quod judicat eo de quo judicat est
melius}, he shows that number and wisdom are superior to man's
reason.

~Vhether

pertinent.

or not these two are distinct is not here

The important point is that they exist, that they

are common to all men, that they are immutable, and that they
are superior to man's reason.

Therefore, since some such thing

exists above our minds, God exists.

For God is either this

thing, or, if there is another still higher, then the latter
is God.

In any case, God exists.

This is the proof as St. Augustine presents it in his
De Libero Arbitrio.33

It must be admitted that it seems

unfinished and that it gives rise, if not to objections, at
least to demands for a fuller explanation.

33

It is evident that

In the Libri Retractationum nothing is said which affects
the proof.

~

------------------------------------------------------.
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it is sinuous and discursive.

These questions, however, will

be taken up in later sections of this paper.

~-·----------------------------------~

CHAPTER II
THE PROOl', IN THE DE VERA RELIGIONE
In this section st. Augustine's proof for the existence
of God will be taken as it stands in the De Vera Religione and
will be treated in much the same manner as was that contained
in the De Libero Arbitrio.
Augustine

That is, the-thought which

developed will be stated as faithfully and accurately

as we can present it, with little added.

No criticism of the

argument will be given here, no judgment concerning its validity
and only that comment which seems necessary in calling attention
to some particularly significant point.

Fewer references to

the text are required in this section, since the argument in
this work is quite brief and compact.
The De

~

Religione was written at Tagaste between

389 and 391, and the work is addressed to Romanianus, the
kindly gentleman whose generosity had made it possible for the
young Augustine to continue his studies at Carthage after his
father's death.
of the most

The purpose of the treatise is to present some

fund~aental

•

truths of Catholicism and at the same

time to refute the Manichaeans; in fact, it is the last of
those five works of Augustine which Paulinus of Nola referred
25
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to as the Pentateuchum contra Manichaeos.l
It seems necessary here, not to present the whole
argument which precedes the proof for the existence of God, but
merely to point out some of the statements which are pertinent
to our later discussion.

The first of these statements is the

reiterated insistence upon the

in~utability

of God, in

distinction to all else which is mutable.
Quamobrem sit tibi manifestum atque
perceptum, nullum errorem in religione
esse potuisse, si anima pro Deo suo
non coleret animam, aut corpus, aut
phantasmata sua, aut horum aliqua
duo conjuncta, aut certe simul
omnia: sed in hac vita societati
generis humani sine dolo temporaliter
congruens, aeterna meditaretur,
unum Deum colens; qui nisi permaneret
incommutabilis, nulla mutabilis
natura remaneret. Mutari autem
animam posse, non quidem localiter,
sed tamen temporaliter, suis
affectionibus quisque cognoscit.
Corpus vero et temporibus et locis
esse mutabile, cuivis advertere
facile est. Phantasmata porro
nibil sunt aliud quam de specie
corporis corporeo sensu attracta
figmenta: quae memoriae mandare ut
accepta aunt, vel partiri, vel
multiplicare, vel contrahere, vel
distendere, vel ordinare, vel perturbare,
vel quolibet modo figurare cogitando
facillimum est, sed cum verum
quaeritur, cavere et vitare difficile.2

1
2

Bourke, Augustine's Quest of Wisdom, 117-121, contains an
excellent pr~cis of the whOTe work.
De Vera Religione, 10, 18; PL 34, 130.

~
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And it is to this attribute of God that Augustine constantly
appeals in his proof.
The second notable point is Augustine's discussion of
the respective places of reason and of authority.

In chapters

24-28, inclusive, he treats of authority, even showing that
reason must be used to establish the validity of authority.
Then, in chapter 29, where he begins the proof for the existence
of God, he shows how man is led to God by reason.
Et quoniam de auctoritatis beneficentia,
quantmn in praesentia satis visum est,
locuti sumus; videamus quatenus ratio
possit progredi a visibilibus ad
invisibilia, et a temporalibus ad
aeterna conscendens.3
He begins the process by noting that every living
substance is to be set above every non-living substance.

But

there is a hierarchy even among living substances, for that
power is outstanding in the human soul, not by which it senses
sensible things, but by which it forms judgments about sensible
things.

Brutes may have more acute sense perceptions than

humans; but they cannot judge what the senses bring to them,
whereas we can judge even the senses themselves.

And it is

clear that the one judging is more excellent than the thing
about which the judgment is made.4

3
4

Ibid.,

29, 53; PL 34, 145.

Hence, as sensitive life

IbiO., 29, 53; PL 34, 145: " ••• praestantiorem esse judicantem
quam illa rea est de qua judicatur."
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is higher than mere inanimate existence, so is rational life
higher than both.
This would make our rational nature the highest of
natures, if it judges according to itself; that is, if it is
itself the final norm for judgment.

However, the reason is

mutable, now knowing more, now less, judging better the more
it participates in science or wisdom.

Therefore, we must look

into this science or wisdom--not that gained by sensible
experience, but that gained by reasoning.

For a certain lack

of harmony in construction, say, may offend our senses, while
a symmetrical arrangement pleases them.
merely due to experience?

Why is this?

No, it cannot be.

Is it

Fbr it is

harmony in beautiful objects which givesus pleasure.

This

harmony depends upon unity, equality, a gradation of unlike
parts.

However, since bodies are not simply one, this unity

cannot be seen by bodily eyes nor by any sense.
perceived by the mind alone.

It can be

We would not seek equality in

bodies nor be able to judge that a corporeal object is
imperfect, if the mind could not see what is perfect and so
be able to compare and to judge.5
Now all sensibly beautiful objects are changeable in

5

Ibid., 29, 55; PL 34, 146: "Unde enim qualiscumque in
corporibus appeteretur aequalitas, aut unde convinceretur
longe plurimum differre a perfecta, nisi ea quae perfecta
est mente videretur?"
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space and time; but the unity and equality, according to which
the mind judges these objects, is independent of space and time.
For according to this unity and equality we judge all things,
whatever their loca,tion in space and time: a round cartwheel
or a round vase or a round coin.

Equal years, equal months,

equal days--all are judged "by the one identical and
unchangeable equality.n6

Moreover, since greater and smaller

figures or motions are judged according to the same law of
similarity or equality, this law is greater potentially than
all these things.

In space of place or time, however, it is

neither greater nor smaller: not greater, for then we could not
judge lesser things according to the whole law; not smaller,
for then we could not judge greater things by it.
law is entirely immutable.

Hence this

Hence too we see that the mutable

human mind does not judge according to itself, but according
to this law.

Therefore, there is

s~mething

above the human

mind: an unchangeable law, which is called truth.7
So far, St. Augustine has shown that sensitive life is
above inanimate creation; that rational life is above sensitive
life; that there is an unchangeable law, called truth, above

6
7

Ibid., 30, 56; PL 34, 147: " ••• eadem una et incommutabili
aequitate."
Ibid.: "Haec autem lex omnium artium cum sit omnino incommutabilis, mens vero humana cui talem legem videre concessum
est, mutabilitatem pati possit erroris, satis apparet supra
rationem nostram esse legem, quae veritas dicitur."
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the mind and according to which the mind judges.

Now he states

that this immutable nature above the rational soul is God
Himself.
Nee jam illud ambigendum est, incommutabilem naturam, quae supra rationalem
animam sit, Deum esse; et ibi esse
primam vitam et primam essentiam, ubi
est prima sapientia.8
The reason for this is that the mind, Wich does not judge
of bodies according to itself, must acknowledge the superiority
of that nature about which it cannot judge, but according to
which it judges.

Since my mind recognizes equality, I can say

why similar parts of any body ought to correspond to one
another.

Accordingly I judge that those things are better in

so far as they are closer to the law which I see mentally.

But

I cannot say why these things which I understand ought to be as
they are.

Why these things please us and why we love them,

we cannot say.9
As we judge inferior beings according to the truth, so
only the Truth judges us.

Even the Father judges according

to this standard of truth; "non enim minor est quam ipse.ulO
According to the same law of truth does the Son judge men.

8
9

10

Ibid., 31, 57; PL 34, 147.
T'5I'd., 31, 58; PL 34, 148: "Quare autem nobis placeant, et
cur-ea, quando melius sapimus, vehementissime diligamus,
ne id quidem quisquam, si ea rite intelligit, dicere
audeb1t. 11
Ibid., 31, 58; PL 34, 148
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"Ita etiam, quantum potest, lex ipsa etiam ipse fit, secundum
quam judicat omnia, et de qua judicare nullus potest.nll
In this He acts much the same as men, who judge of temporal
laws when they make them; but once these laws have been
established, a judge does not judge about these laws, but
according to them.

Moreover, good men consult the eternal law,

about which they cannot judge, when they decide what must be
ordered or forbidden.

To understand the difference, let it be

noted that, when we cognize something, it suffices to see that
tbat thing is such or such; but, when we judge, we add that it
ought to be such or such.
Actually the argument was completed when Augustine said
thBt the immutable nature above reason is God Himself.
Augustine adds an explanation of the difference between judging
about something and judging according to it.

He does this, it

would seem, to bring out the fact that the eternal, immutable
truth above our minds is God Himself.
However, this fact does not seem really to be proved
here.

God is truth, but we do not use Him directly as a norm

for judging.

Perhaps St. Augustine here would say that God

is the only sufficient reason for the truth existing above our
intellects.

11 Ibid.

Perhaps he confuses the abstracted truths which

~--------------------------------~
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we know with the subsistent Truth which is God.

He certainly

proceeds quickly and without explanation rrom the rule of
truth above our intellects to the existence of God.

Since it

is the purpose of succeeding chapters to discuss the principle
on which the argument is based and the validity of the proof,
in this place the procedure which St. Augustine employed is
simply set down.
The course, then, that the arguraent takes is this:
sensitive creatures are higher in the scale of being than
inanimate things; rational beings are higher than irrational;
but above the rational soul is the truth, according to which the
soul judges, but about which it cannot judge.

This eternal,

immutable truth is God Himself.
About this statement of the argument certain features may
be noted.

First the argument is philosophical, given in answer

to the question: How can the reason lead us to God?

Second,

the procedure is up the scale of' being to that which is
immutable.

Third, the approach is through the soul, the soul's

realization that there is something superior to itself.

Fourth,

the last step--that the immutable Truth is God--is brief,
quick, and by no means immediately evident.

It seems that some

previous knowledge of God is required, at least the vulgar
notion of Him.

Finally, the principle used to determine the

superiority of one being to another is the same as that used

33

in the Q! Libero Arbitrio; namely, that that which judges about
another is superior to that about which it judges.
The chapters of the De Vera Religione which follow are not
pertinent to our present argument, and so may be dismissed
without comment here.

~--------------------------------------.

CHAPTER III
COMPLETE SYNTHESIS 01' THE PROOF
1

In this section, the argument will be put together in its
fullest form.

Although it is nowhere presented by St.

Augustine more completely than in the De Libero Arbitrio, it
will help to gather the various presentations so as to form
one complete statement of it.l

Hence, various texts--drawn

from De Vera Religione, De Libero Arbitrio, De Diversis
Quaestionibus
in order.

L~XXIII,

Confessiones, De Ordine-- will be adduced

It is hoped thus to round out our presentation of

the argument in St. Augustine himself.
The great Bishop regularly begins his argument from a
consideration of the different grades of being, showing in
what way one is higher than another.

1

His purpose is to arrive

Charles Boyer, S.J., Essais sur la Doctrine de Saint
Augustin, Gabriel Beauchesne-et ~s Fils, Paris, 1932, 62:
"L'ascension tout entiere avec tous ses·degres, que saint
Augustin reprend si souvent d'une fagon vraiment identique,
forme un unique tout, une seule demonstration. Le sensible,
le sens, la raison, la verite qui est au-dessus de la
raison, voila lea etapes necessaires de l'itin~raire, quand
il est Drace avec le souci d'etre complet."
34
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at God at the summit of all beings.2

Some beings merely exist,

some have life, some have intelligence.

Living beings are

higher than those merely existing, since they have the two
perfections of existence arid life. 3

Rational beings are higher

in the scale, since they have intelligence as well as existence
and life. 4
Further to prove this gradation, St. Augustine sometimes
even goes through the exterior senses and the interior sense,
which so gathers the data brought in through the exterior
senses that its possessor seeks what is good for itself and
avoids what is harmful.

The interior sense is superior to the

exterior senses, since it both senses corporeal things and also
is aware of the sense itself.

However, since all this activity

is on the sense level, how can it truly be said that the
interior sense is superior?

It is superior ultimately, not

because it has the exterior senses as ita object, but because
it in

2
3
4

som~

way "judges" them, recognizing what they need and

Let it be noted again, however, that in the De Libero
Arbitrio he first demonstrates the aptitude 0? the mind
for truth.
De Vera Religione, 29, 52·; PL 34, 145:, "Quaelibet namque
Viva substantia cuilibet non vivae substantiae, naturae
lege praeponitur."
De Libero Arbitrio, II, 3, 7; PL 32, 1243-4: "Quia cum tria
Sfnt haec, esse, vivere, intelligere; et lapis est, et pecus
vivit, nee tamen lapidem puto vivere, aut pecus intelligere;
qui autem intelligit, eum et esse et vivere, certissimum
est; quare non dubito id excellentius judicare, cui omnia
tria insunt, quam id cui unum vel duo desit."
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directing them to action.

The important principle used here

and to be used again is often reiterated: "Nulli autem dubium
est eum qui judicat, eo de quo judicat esse meliorem."5

Again,

fiJam vero il1ud videre facillimum est, praestantiorem esse
judicantem, quam illa res est de qua judicatur."6

And it is

made use of in the statement: "Mens enim humana de visibilibus
judicans, potest agnoscere omnibus visibilibus seipsam esse
meliorem."7
Up to this point, St. Augustine has proved the superiority
of sentient life to inanimate creation, and, among the senses,
the superiority of the interior to the exterior.

He then

pushes the argument further, in order to demonstrate that there
is something in man higher even than the interior sense.
Applying the principle just stated, we see that reason is
higher than anything else in man.8

The proof of this is: "Non

solum autem rationalis vita de sensibi1ibus, sed de ipsis
quoque sensibus judicat."9
Therefore, the best part of man, that which is highest in
the scale of being, is human reason.

\Vhy is St. Augustine so

5 Ibid., II, 5, 12; PL 32, 1247.
6 ~Vera Rel~ione, 29, 53; PL 34, 145.
7 De D!Versis
aestionibus LXXXIII, q. 45; PL 40, 28.
8 De Libero .Arbitrio, II, 6, 13; PL 32, 1248: "A. Q;uare vide,
oosecro, utrum aliquid invenire possis, quod sit in natura
hominis ratione sublimius. E. Nihil omnino melius video."
9 De Vera Religione, 29, 53; PL 34, 145.
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anxious to establish this factt

The reason is that he wishes

to prove that, if there exists a reality superior to the
human reason, then God exists.

Unless he had demonstrated that

reason is superior to all other created beings., his argument
could not proceed; for evidently he begins with a notion of
God as the supreme being.

Boyer puts the argument in a neat

syllogismlO which brings out the point well.

He says:

S'il est quelque chose au dessus de
notre raison, Dieu existe. Or il est
quelque chose au dessus de notre
raison. Done, Dieu existe.ll
As was noted in the presentation of the argument in the
De Libero Arbitrio, the apodosis of the major comes upon us
with something of a surprise.

To explain it we may say that

the point of the preceding proof is not merely to show that
there is nothing above the reason in man, but to lead up to the
fact that there is something above the reason outside man.
However, merely to prove the existence of a reality outside man

10

11

It is helpful to reduce St. Augustine's argument to
syllogistic form, but it must be noted that the scholastic
brevity is not his. L. de Mondadon, "De la Connaissance
de Soi-m~me )a. la Connaissance de Dieu, 11 in Recherches de
Science Religeuse, Paris, 1913, 148, gives this warningwhile commenting on Portalie's precis of;the argument:
11
Incontestablement, ce syllogisme a le merite de dire les
/
chases d 'une fagon 'a 1 a fo i s courte, d"
egagee
et claire,
mais je'ne surprendrai personne en ajoutant que cette vive
et seche allure ne se retrouve pas dans saint Augustin."
Charles Boyer, S.J., L'Idee de Verite dans la Philosophie
de Saint Augustin, Gabriel Beauchesne, PariB; 1920, 50.
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and superior to man's reason, is not necessarily to attain to
God.

Consequently, Augustine proceeds through the reason for

a very definite purpose.

He wishes to find there something

which will lead him to God.

This thing is truth.

Gilson describes this procedure of St. Augustine in
much the same way as we have given it:
Toute notre recherche, en effet, tend
vers un ~tre necessaire, irr~uable,
eternal, tel qu'il n'en existe pas
de plus grand et qui par consequent
soit Dieu. Il ne suffit done pas de
depasser l'homme pour atteindre un
tel ~tre, mais il faut depasser en
l'homrae quelque chose de tel que ce
qui se trouve au dela ne puisse etre
que Dieu. Or une seule voie possible
s'ouvre devant une recherche ainsi
engagee: cella qui passe par la verite.l2
How does the fact that the intellect possesses truth lead
us to God?

It is due to the character of truth, its eternity

and immutability.

Augustine evidently pre-supposes a common

notion of God as the supreme, eternal, and immutable Being.
Hence the existence above our intellects of eternal, immutable
truth will prove the existence of God.
Now, the intellect recognizes that it is itself mutable
and that there is above it immutable truth.

12

"Quae tamen cum

,
'
/
Etienne Gilson, Introduction a l'Etude de Saint Augustin,
Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Paris,-r93l, 18.
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etiam se propter defectum prof'ectumque in sapientia fatetur
esse mutabilem, invenit supra se esse incommutabilem veritatem:
atque ita adhaerens post ipsam ••• beata efficitur.nl3
One class of truth is number, a favorite example of St.
Augustine.

Number is built up of unity, which CC:tnnot be

perceived by the senses.

No body can produce the notion of

unity, since no body is simply one.

1he senses, whose object

is corporeal substances, cannot give us the notion of unity.
The reason cannot produce unity as an effect, because this
notion is common to all without being changed in any way by
the fact that it is known.

1he laws of number are eternally

true, whether apprehended or not.l4

Therefore, number is an

eternal, immutable truth.l5
Another such truth is Wisdom, either in speculative or in
moral matters.

Wisdom consists in knowing and possessing the

supreme good.

"Num aliam putas esse sapientiam nisi veritatem,

in qua cernitur et tenetur summum bonum?nl6

13
14

15

De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII, q. 45; PL 40, 28.
De Ordine, II, 19, 5o; PL 32, 1018: "Sed unum ad duo, vel
duo ad quattuor, verissima ratio est: nee magis heri f'uit
ista ratio vera quam hodie; nee magis eras aut post annum
erit vera; nee si omnia iste mundus concidat, poterit
ista ratio non esse."
Cf'. De Libero Arbitrio, II, 8, 20-24; PL 32, l251-3;De
Vera~e1i~ione, c. 30; PL 34, 145-7; De Ordine, II, ~;
~2,

16

Wisdom is common

1o 1-3.

--

De Libero Arbitrio, II, 9, 26; PL 32, 1254.
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to all men in that all seek the Supreme Good, whether or not
they are mistaken in pursuing what they think is good.
Moreover, the rules of wisdom are eternal and unchangeable.
For example, it always has been, is, and always will be true
that eternal things are to be preferred to temporal.

Wisdom,

therefore, constitutes another example of eternal, immutable
truth.
Quam ergo verae atque incommutabiles
aunt regulae numerorum, quorum rationem
atque veritatem incommutabiliter atque
communiter omnibus eam cernentibus praesto
esse dixisti; tam aunt verae atque
incommutabiles regulae sapientiae, de
quibus paucis nunc singillatim interrogatus
respondisti esse veras atque manifestas,
easque omnibus qui haec intueri valent,
communes ad contemplandum adesse concedis.l7
Having proved the existence of such truth, Augustine then
shows that this truth is above our intellects.

The intellect

recognizes the fact that the truth is superior to it.l8

The

truth is not inferior to reason, since the intellect does not
judge about the laws of number or wisdom, but judges according
to them.l9

It is not equal to reason, since the truth is

17
18

"'C'r. also Confessiones, VII, 10, 16; PL 32, 742: "Intravi

De Libero Arbitrio, II, 10, 29; PL 32, 1257.

19

et vidi qualicumque oculo animae meae supra eundem oculum
animae meae supra mentem meam, lucero incommutabilem."
De Libero Arbitri;o, II, 12, 34; PL 32, 1259: "Non examint;ttor
corrigit, sed tantum laetatur inventor."
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immutable, whereas human reason is mutable.2°

It remains,

then, that the truth, eternal and immutable, exists above our
intellects.
Sometimes St. Augustine at once brings the
a close here, for this truth is God Himself.
~

argu~ent

to

So in the De

Religione he says: ":Nee jam illud ambigendum est, incom-

mutabilem naturam, quae supra rationalem animam sit, Deum esse;
et ibi esse primarn vitam et primam essentiam, ubi est prima
sapientia."21

So too in the Confessiones he exclaims of the

unchangeable light above his intellect: "Qui novit veritatem,
novit earn; et qui novit earn, novit aeternitatem.
novit eam.

Charitas

0 aeterna veritas, et vera charitas, et chara

aeternitas t tu es Deus meus; tibi suspiro die ac nocte.n22
In the De Libero Arbitrio, however, he goes a bit
further.

He says that, by showing that there exists some

reality above our intellects, he has shown that God exists; for
either this reality (truth) is itself God, or, if there is some
being above it, this latter is God.

"Si enim aliquid est

excellentius, ille potius Deus est; si autem non est, jam ipsa
veritas Deus est.

20

21
22

Sive ergo illud sit, sive non sit, Deum

Ibid.: "Si autem asset aequalis mentibus nostris haec
veritas, mutabilis etiam ipsa esset. Mentes enim nostrae
aliquando earn plus vident, aliquando minus, et ex hoc
fatentur se esse mutabiles."
De ~ Religione, 31, 57; PL 34, 147.
Confessiones, VII, 10, 16; PL 32, 742.
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tamen esse, negare non poteris."23
Just how St. Augustine arrives at this conclusion does
not immediately appear.

The principle behind the proof will,

however, be treated in chapter IV.

Here we may note that

Augustine gives some hint of it in the De Diversis

~uaestionibus

LXXXIII:
Quod autem est omni anima melius, id Deum
dicimus ••• Intelligit autem rationalis
anima Deum. Nam intelligit quod semper
ejusmodi est, neque ullam patitur mutationem.
At et corpus per tempus et locos, et anima
ipsa rationalis, quod aliquando sapiens,
aliquando stulta est, mutationem patitur.
Quod autem semper eodem modo est, melius
profecto est quam id quod non ita est. Nee
quidquam est melius rationali anima nisi Deus.24
Here the Bishop of Hippo evidently pre-supposes a vulgar
notion of God as an immutable being, superior to every other
being.25

Having, then, proved that the human reason is not the

highest in the order of being, but that there exists an
unchangeable reality superior to it, he concludes that God
exists.

23
24

25

De Libero Arbitrio, II, 15, 39; PL 32, 1262.
De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII, q. 54; PL 40, 38. And
In the Retractationes, c. 26; PL 32, 627, Augustine amends
the statement: "Ubi quod dixi, 1 Quod autem est omni anima
melius, id Deum dicimus,' magis dici debuit, "Omni create
spiritu melius. '"
Gilson, Introduction, 12: 11 D1 abord il est clair qu'aux
yeux de saint Augustin l'idee de Dieu est une connaissance
universelle et naturellement inseparable de l'esprit
humain."
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This is the complete "psychological" argument of St.
Augustine for the existence of God.

With all its nuances, its

long and leisurely winding, its flashes of rhetoric, it is
typically Augustine's.

Put in cold scholastic form, as we

noted above, it loses the character given it by its author.
However, for the sake of summary, the brief statement of it
given by Portali~ will suffice to conclude this chapter.
Elle repose sur la constation d'une verite
eternelle et immuable, superieure
l'homme,
et pourrait Btre formulee ainsi: La raison
de l'homme ••• occupant le plus haut degre
de la hierarchie des etres de ce monde, si
elle decouvre un 6tre plus parfait, oet
~tre sera Dieu.
Or, ma raison constate
~u•au-dessus d'elle, 11 y a la verite
eternelle et immuable, qu•elle ne cree pas,
mais qu'elle contemple, qui n'est ni mienne,
ni en mol, puisque les autres la contemplent
aussi bien que mol et hors de mol. Cette
verite est done Dieu lui-meme, ou si l'on
suppose en ~tre encore plus eleve, nous
conduit de moins a cet ~tre, source de
toute verite.26

a

26

E. Portalie, article "Saint Augustin" in Dictionnaire de
The6logie Catholique, editors A. Vacant et alii, Letouzey
et Ane, Paris, 1903, I, 2345.
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CHAPTER IV
THE PRINCIPLE ON WHICH THE PROOF IS BASED
Now that the "psychological" proof has been set down as
contained in its two principal sources and assembled completely
in a separate section, our discussion of it may get under way.
As was indicated in more than one place, the final step in the
argumentation is somewhat obscure.
~lowly

St. Augustine proves

and carefully that there exists an immutable reality,

called Truth, above our intellects.
that God exists.

Then he hastens to conclude

Is he justified in so doing?

complete in itself?

Is his proof

If the proof is complete, on what principle

does the final step depend?

These are the questions which

ought to be answered.
Before discussing these questions, however, it is well
to call to mind again that Augustine employed most of the
traditional proofs for God's existence (although almost never
specifically as proofs, but only as parts of

se~1ons

or

meditations) and did not confine himself to this one alone.
Usually he gave these arguments in a highly literary style,
taking little care to develop them fully and with philosophical
exactness.

Portali~ describes his method well:
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Il a touche a toutes les preuves classiques
de l'existence de Dieu, mais on trouverait
rarement chez lui une demonstration
systematique. Il attache une importance
particuliere au consentement du genre
humain ••• L'antique preuve par la finalite
et l'ordre du monde a ete developee par
lui avec une delicatesse, une grace, une
emotion inimitables: partout dans la
beaute de la nature il lit le nom de
L t archi tee te di vin ••• Mais son eloquence
est surtout admirable quand il developpe
la preuve metaphysique du monde fini et
changeant, reclamant un createur infini
et immuable.l
The reason for bringing in this reminder is that some
maintain that the proof we are treating is not complete in
itself.

Should this claim on examination prove correct, or

should it be decided that the proof is invalid, one should
realize that St. Augustine did not pin all his rational attempts
to prove God's existence on this single proof.
Descoqs attacks the argument precisely on the ground
that it is incomplete in itself.

He argues that the only

possibility of saving it is by reducing it to some other
argument.

He says:
Mais du point de vue strictement rationnel,
dans l'ordre du discours scientifique et
dans le plan de la construction rigoureuse,
d'une construction systematique et
ordonnee de l'edifice de nos connaissances
sur Dieu, les discussions
que nous avons
\
poursuivies dans la these, montrent assez,

1

Portalie, "Saint Augustin," DTC, I, 2344.
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nous semble-t-il, que cette preuve ne suffit
pas,
elle toute seule, pour conclure de
fagon efficace. Le seul moyen de lui
conserver une valeur probante est de la
ramener
la contingence soit par ltinterm~diaire des r~alites concretes d'oh lea
idees abstraitea, interm~diai~e que nous
avons nous-meme reconnu valable dans la
critique de la premi~re partie de la these,
mais une telle r~duction ne semble pas
~tre du tout dans la ligne de pensee de
s. Augustin; soit en consid~rant ces
idees comme creees, comme produites en
nous par une cause transcendante et d'ou
nous remonterions
celle-ci par la voie de
causalite, ou plus exactement comme un
reflet o~ noua saisirions d'embl~e la cause
transcendante.2

a

a

a

Even then he is dissatisfied with the proof.

rr:Mais

n'implique-t-elle pas un innatisme ou du moins toute la th~orie
I'
de l 1 illumination difficilement compatible avec lea donnees

de la psychologie?"3

Moreover, it certainly smacks of

ontologiam, according to the same author.

Other men, as Billot,

Mercier, and Loinaz, agree with him on this point because they
see in the proof an illegitimate conclusion to the existence
of God as the sufficient reason of the eternal, immutable
truths above our intellects; whereas these truths actually have
reality, antecedently to our knowing them, only in so far as
they are known by the divine intellect.

In other words, once

we already know that God exists, we know the eternal reality

2

Pedro Deacoqs, S.J., Praelectiones Tbeologiae Naturalia,
·Gabriel Beauchesne et Sea Fila, Paris, l935, II, 131-2.
3 ~., II, 132.
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of these truths.

But we cannot conclude to the existence of

God, not otherwise known, as the sufficient reason of these
truths; for, given the essences of finite things and the
abstractive power of our intellect, there is no need to seek
the sufficient reason for them in the existence of God.

In

this way does Descoqs, along with Billot,4 Loinaz,5 Nlercier,6
and others, argue against the proof.

Even some of its

defenders feel that ultimately it must be reduced to one of the
Quinque Viae in order to be complete.

A full discussion of

this question, however, is relegated to the i"'ollowing chapter.
We record the opinion that the proof is not complete in itself
only as an aid to our chief effort in this section: to discover
the principle of the argument as St. Augustine understood it,
the principle he intended to employ.
Those who defend the argument as being complete maintain

4

5
6

Louis Billot, S.J., De Deo Uno et Trino, Universitas
Pontifica Gregoriana;-Rome,~35; 76 (note); " ••• argumentum
profecto non concludit nisi ostendatur ipsam naturam
rationalem non esse a se, sed a prima causa a qua pendet
rerum universitas, et tunc fit reductio ad unam e quinque
viis supra expositis. Si autem procederet argumentum ex ipsa
obiectiva necessitate et aeternitate quam in his principiis
mens nostra intuetur, quasi per se solam argueret exsistentianl alicuius entis necessarii, sic non videtur valida
demonstratio. 11
John R. Loinaz, S.J., Praelectiones e Theologia Naturali,
Marietti, Taurini, 1928, 81-82. Cf. 'Chapter V for opinion.
D• .J. Mercier, M~taphysique GtSne'rale, Insti tut Superieur de
Philosophie, Louvain, 1923, 40-50. His opinion too is
treated in Chapter V of this paper.
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that Augustine intended that it prove the existence of God as
in some way the sufficient reason for the eternal, universal,
immutable truth above our intellects.

But not all agree on

the principle which he employed.
In an article on the philosophy of St. Augustine, Van
steenberghen briefly reviews the proof, then says in conclusion
that the argument proves the existence of God as exemplary
cause.
La disjonction ~tablie entre le reel et
l'ideal par la conception platonicienne de
la connaissance intellectuelle, semble
exclure une interpretation strictement
metaphysique de 1 'argument !lideologique, n
bien que, aux yeux de s. Augustin, lea
caracteres-ae ra-ierfte-r~velent une
valeur absolue, ontologique, metaphysique,
et non pas ideale seulement. Dans cet
argument, le rapport entre les "Incommutabiliter vera" et la "Veritas
incommutabil~semble bien impliquer lea
notions de participation et de causalit~
exemplaire. - D'autre part, a cote et
auteur de l'argument ideologique proprement
dit, les idees de contingence, de
causalit~, et de creation ~ont frequemment
utilisees par s. Augustin. 7
Not completely satisfied with this statement of his
position, Van Steenberghen explains and qualifies it.
I

Mais ces perspectives differentes ne

7

F'. Van Steenberghen, "La Philo sophie de ~. Augustin d' apres
les travaux du Centenaire," in Revue N~o-Scolastique de
Philosophie, Institut Superieur de Philosophie, Louvain,

1933, 248.
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paraissent pas parfaitement unifiees et
une mise au point s'impose: il suffir~it
de dire, par exemple, que la n~cessite
mitaphysique du vrai est / saisie, par nous
autres hommes, dans le reel contingent,
pour assurer
la preuve augustinienne
une base inebranlable. Car elle s'appuyerait
alors sur les caract~res de nos jugements
consid~res, non pas dans leur signification
purement logique ou id~ale, ni dans leur
existence/eurement psychologique, mais dans
leur port e metaphysique. Rattachee
solidement
l'ordre reel, la preuve
augustinienne devient une preuve metaphysique authentique, ou, plus exactement,
l'unique preuve metaphysique consid~r~e
sous l'angle\ du vrai transcendental et
aboutissant a l'affirmation de Dieu comme
Verite subsistante et Cause premi~re
exemplaire.8

a

~

~

a

~

This explanation is not convincing, at least if it is
intended to prove that the argument is complete and yet not an
ontological argument.

If recourse be made to "Le reel con-

tingent"--from which the intellect can by its abstractive power
arrive at universal truth--then there seems to be no need to
appeal to the existence of God.
point of the whole proof.

And this

~tter

is exactly the

Hence Descoqs' rather trenchant

criticism of Van Steenberghen's case seems justified.
La premiere partie de ces conclusions nous
paratt certaine et ne saurait soulever de
difficultes serieuses. La seconde en revanche
demanderait des precisions. Hous consentons sans aucune peine et nous/
soutenons bien en effet que 11 la necessit~
m~taphysique du vrai saisie dans le reel

8

Ibid.
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contingent peut assurer 'a cette preuve
metaphysique consid6r~e sous l'angle du vrai
transcendental une base in~branlable," mais
a la condition de l'appuyer sur la contingence
de ce meme r~el, c'est-a-dire en derni~re
analyse, comme l'indiquent les mots m~mes,
sur 1, 1 insuffisanceAdans
l'~tre, et done sur
,
la necessite de l'?tre prem~er, cause
efficiente de ce reel, et par le fait meme,
cause exemplaire. Si causalite exemplaire
est detachee de l'autre, elle reate, quoad
nos, sans point d'attache, au-dessus du
VIae, et ne ~ prouve rien.9
~

Of course a rejection of one argument adduced is not
sufficient to throw out the whole possibility that the
argument is intended to prove the existence of God as exemplary
cause.

Nor is this procedure attempted here.

Instead, let us

first review other opinions.
Boyer insists very strongly that the principle underlying
the argument is the principle of causality.

After a long

introduction to the point, he says: "Si importante, si decisive
m~me, en quelque sorte, qu 1 en soit la raison, il faut la dire

sans plus attendre: le philosophe d 1 Hippone est mu par le
principe de causalite••• rrlO

Whereupon Boyer sets forth

numerous examples of the use Augustine made of this principle:
in his De Genesi ad Litteram (IV, 32, 49), in his Enarrationes
in Psalmos (Ps. 44, n. 13), in his De Trinitate (XII, 5, 5), in

9
10

Descoqs, Praelectiones, II, 134.
Boyer, Essals, 58.
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his De Civitate Dei (XI, 4, 2), etc.

He observes rather

disgustedly: "Certains semblent vraiment trop croire qu'il
faille etre p~ripattticien jusqu 1 aux moelles pour avoir l'id~e
de cause, et pour s'en servir.ull
It is true that the examples of St. Augustine's use of
the principle of causality would point to God as efficient
cause.

However, Boyer rather seems to hold that this

"psychological" argument proves the existence of a God Who is
exemplary cause.

For in summarizing the argument, speaking of

Wisdom and Truth, he says:
Mais ces perfections, qui sont substantiellement Dieu, nous les percevons
travers le reflet d'elles-m&mes dans
notre arne. Leur empreinte, leur
participation, et pour dire le mot,
leur image, est en notre arne, est
notre arne en sa partie superieure; et
"' ,
la preuve de Dieu consiste precisement
'a aaiair que la regle
'
/
de notre pensee
et de notre vouloir, c'est-a-dire
notre raison qui est bien n3tre et
qui eat une partie de notre arne,
n'est
"'
intelligible que comme~ar~icipation
et comme image d•une verite absolue
qui est Dieu.l2

a

De Mondadon also believes that progress in the argumentation is made by use of the principle of causality, perhaps
both efficient and exemplary.

11
12

Ibid., 61.
Ibid., 90.

After presenting his outline
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of the argument, he adds:
\

Au reste, le passage de l'un a l'autre se
fait par l'interm6diaire de la causalite,
~ laquelle on nous renvoie, quand on parle
de lumi~re intelligible ••• et de ma~tre
interieur ••• ou plus clairement, quand on
nomme la verite vie et arne de l'ame
raisonable,l3
,-

,

,.

A

And in the passage which follows, he indicates that Augustine
intended to prove God either as exemplary or as efficient cause.
From his summary of' the argument quoted at the conclusion

,

of the last section, it appears that Portalie understands
Augustine to proceed by way of causality, probably efficient
causality.

For, he says, the argument must conclude to an

immutable "source de toute verite."
Before presenting our own conclusion, we may profitably
learn the position of one more authority.

Gilson frankly

admits that st. Augustine knew the principle of causality and
that he made use of it in some places to prove the existence
of God.
Sans doute, Augustin a souvent et expressement
insist( sur le fait que la mutabilite meme
du monde des corps atteste sa contingence
et sa dependance h l'egard d'un etre
necessaire qui est Dieu. On ne peut done
nier que sa doctrine contienne tous les
elements necessaires d'une preuve de ce

13

De Mondadon, 11 De la Connaissance de Soi-m~me 'a la
Connaissance de Dieu," 155-6.
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genre,.. et par consequent que cette preuve
ne soit compatible avec l'augustinisme
le plus authentique.l4
However, Gilson very justly notes that St. Augustine used
such proofs rather as pious meditations, as parts of sermons
or discourses, rather than as proofs properly so called.

Where

he does develop a proper proof, he always passes by way of the
mind.

Why so?

Gilson answers:

,

Et la raison en est claire. Interrogees
par nous sur leur nature et leur origine,
les choses sensibles repondent en effet
par le spectacle de leur mutabilit~ m~me:
ce n'est pas nous qui nous sommes faites; il
faut done les transcender pour atteindre
leur cause; or leur cause ne peut "etre
atteinte en tant que cause de ce qu'elles
ont de changeant et contingent, qui est
du non ~tre, mais en tant que cause de
ce qu 1 elles ont de stable, qui est de
l'~tre.
Ce qu'elles ont de stable, c'est
le nombre, 1 1 ordre et la mesure; or,
au-dessus de leur nombre se t~ouve celui
de notre pensee qui les connait; transcendons ce nombre lui-m~me,
nous
I
I
atteignons celui de la Verite qui est
Dieu.I5
'
Therefore, in going by way of the mind, one arrives at
the truth.

Especially are mathematical and metaphysical

truths apt for the proof, since they are eternal and immutable.
The only sufficient reason for these truths is God Himself.
Thus, Gilson evidently concludes that the principle underlying

14
15

Gilson, Introduction, 24.
Ibid., 25-6.
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the argument is that of sufficient reason.
Le point critique de la d~monstration est
evidemment le dernier, ou Dieu se trouve
posl comme la seule raison suffisante de
~
, presente
,
"a 1 a pensee.
, 16
la verite
The various opinions given above are useful for several
reasons.

l<'irst, they may serve to make precise our own notions.

Second, they are the opinions of men well versed in the writings
of St. Augustine.

Third, by their variety they indicate the

difficulty of the question.

It was stated above that the last

step in St. Augustine's argument is somewhat obscure.

The

very difference of opinion regarding the principle which underlies this last step should amply prove that statement.
In the f'a.ce of such disagreement, it may seem presumptuous to try to resolve the question.

On the other hand,

it would be unsatisfactory to pass over it without giving any
personal opinion and tne reasons for holding it.
In the first place, the conclusion of Descoqs that the
proof is ·in itself incomplete does not seem to me to be
justified.l7

I do not say that the argument is valid; it could

be complete without being valid.
complete.

16
17

And it does appear to be

Why does St. Augustine proceed by way of thought?

Ibid., 23.
Ii1'"'the next chapter, however, I shall criticize the
validity of the proof along much the same lines as
Descoqs does.
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Is it not to arrive a.t something above our mind, something
which has such characteristics that neither sensible objects
nor the mind could produce

it~

In proceeding in this way, he

comes to truth, truth Which is eternal and unchangeable.
he not at once conclude from this that God exists?

Does

The

argumentation, then, appears clear and complete: there must
exist some being itself eternal and immutable, in order to
explain metaphysical and mathematical truth.

It may be granted

that St. Augustine does not explicitly state this step, and
does not explicitly enuntiate his principle.

Nevertheless, his

very manner of' proceeding indicates that he adopted this
particular way for the purpose of arriving at God as the
ultimate explanation for truths of this character.

Therefore,

it seems logical to conclude that the argument is complete
in itself.
burthermore, the objection that some principle must be
dragged,!!! to explain the reasoning, in order to give it a
solid basis, seems unfair and untrue.

VVhen St. Augustine

presented the argument fully, as in the De Libero Arbitrio, he
evidently intended it to be a systematic proof for the
existence of God.
God be

~ecessary

But, unless some principle demanding that
to explain immutable truth were at least

implicitly included, the argument would be no argument at all.
'rhere would be no basis for concluding to God's existence.

r
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However, the whole set-up, in which St. Augustine of set
purpose works toward that truth which is above the intellect
and whose existence demands the existence of God, clearly
indicates that the great African Bishop relied on this principle
in his proof.

Therefore, the principle is in the argument

itself; and need not be shoved into it by its defenders, in
order to bolster an otherwise incomplete proof.
For much the swme reasons as those given above, I conclude
that the principle on which the argument rests is the principle
of sufficient reason.

The argument begins by showing that, in

man, nothing is superior to the intellect.
Augustine so begin?

That he may arrive at the truth, which is

the object of the intellect.
truth?

Why does st.

But why does he work toward

Because truth possesses certain qualities which can be

explained neither by sensible bodies nor by the intellect.

For

the truths chosen by st. Augustine are mathematical and
metaphysical truths, truths which are eternal and immutable.
Why does he select these truths, and, once having proved their
existence above our intellects, immediately conclude that God
exists?

The answer is that these truths are not the product

of our mutable intellects.

Even though the intellect is the

highest thing in man, it cannot serve to explain these truths.
Therefore, God must exist as the only sufficient reason for
these truths--and a God Who is unchangeable and eternal even
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as the truths themselves are.

Consequently, it seems that the

proof rests on the principle of sufficient reason.l8

The

statement of the argument in the De Libero Arbitrio, as
reproduced in Chapter I, will, it appears, bear out those steps
which lead to this conclusion.
In summary, this section was intended to determine the
principle underlying St. Augustine's "psychological" proof for
the existence of God.

It has been seen that some, like Descoqs,

maintain that the argument is in itself not complete.

We have

endeavored to show that it is complete, since it is at least
implicitly based on the principle of sufficient reason - and
this in the very way in which St. Augustine presented it.
Others, who hold that the argument is complete, variously

18

F.J. Thonnard, A.A., Prlcis d'Histoire de la Philosophie,
Desclee et Cie, Paris, 1946, 214. Fr. Thonnard notes that
St. Augustine did not favor the proof from efficient
causality of the sensible world. Then he adds this reason
for Augustine's procedure: 11 Pourquoi repugne-t-il
monter
directement du sensible
Dieu? La raison, semble-t-il,
est que ce chemin ne lui paraissait pas sar. L'ordre des
choses sensibles en effet, pouvait pleinement s'expliquer,
h la mani~re des stoiciens et de Plotin, par l'Ame du
monde, et celle-ci, finie et changeante, n'etaitP'asencore
Dieu. Augustin la jugeait inutile, sachant par la roi que
tout a et6 cree par le Verbe; "Ylais rationnellement, il ne
la jugeait pas absurde; et pour trouver Dieu, il prit,
semble-t-il, le parti de l'eviter. Or la voie,
ses yeux,
la plus, efficace, etait le methode platonicienne du
recueillement et de la purification, le retour par les
degres de notre vie interieure ou le sommet des v~rit~s
eternelles p~rmet d'atteindre incontestablement Dieu, seul
imrnuable et eternel."

a

a

a
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explain the principle from which the conclusion is drawn.
hold out for exemplary causality; others, for efficient
causality; others, for the principle of sufficient reason.
For the reasons given immediately above, we agree with the
last named conclusion.

Some

CHAP'.PER V

0Nrl1 0LOGISM AND THE PROOF; ITS VALIDITY
The fact (if granted) that the proof is complete does not
necessarily prove the validity of the argmnent.

Other

difficulties may be--indeed, have been--urged against this
proof.

The principal of these difficulties is that the

argument is ontological, in so far as it concludes from our
thoughts of the eternal truths to their real existence from
eternity, which fact can only be explained by the real existence
of God.

In his Theodicea, Palumbo lists those who have

especially attacked the argument: Billot, Mercier, Van der
Mersch, Loinaz, Mindorff, Cuervo, Balthazar, Ricard, Descoqs.
Then he observes: "Iuxta auctores praefatos argumentum ideologicum nullum habet valorem ad Dei exsistentiam ostendendam
et demonstrandam et ontologismum aut innatismum sapit.nl
Although it is not our purpose here to discuss ontologism
itself, we may give a definition of what we mean by it.

It is

a system according to which the first and inmediate object of

1 1:' ranciscus Antonius Palumbo, Theodicea, Pontif'icium Athenaeum
Urbanianum, Rome, 1942, 217.
1
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the intellect is God Himself,

~simpliciter,

Whom one

immediately apprehends by simple intuition, in which intuition
one knows all other things.

Although there are several

variations of the system, into which we do not propose to enter,
this definition is satisfactory for the purposes of this
discussion.
With regard to the knowledge of God, the system holds that
the human mind continually intuits God.

Again, this intuition

is variously explained by the Ontologists.

We are concerned

to give only a general statement of the position, since such a
statement is adequate for our purposes.
As a final introductory step, it should be noted that an
argument may be ontological without by that very fact being
ontologistic.

In other words, there may be a transition from

the logical order to the real in the argument (ontological),
and still no confirmation given to and no reliance placed on
the position which holds that the human mind has a direct
intuition of God (ontologistic).
and, we think, legitimate.
argument

~

This distinction is important

In speaking of the ontological

simultaneo, Descoqs makes the same distinction:

Hoc argumentum confundi nequit cum
Ontologismo, et potest proponi quin ullo
modo accipiatur intuitio Ontologistarum,
prouti re vera habetur. Fautores enim
praesentis argumenti in ordine reali
mere abstractive stant, tamquam puncto
a quo, cum dicant ideam Dei infiniti et
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perfecti quam sponte eff'ormant, habere
valorem objectivum absolutum. Sed
plerique, saltern hodierni, omnem intuitionem
Dei respuunt quae esset ratio fundamentalis
illius objectivitatis ideae. Valor enim
virtusque a priori rationis ad hoc
stabiliendum juxta eos sufficiunt.2
There are varied opinions in this matter.

Some authors

maintain that the argument is ontological; some, that it is
ontologistic; some, that it is both ontological and ontologistic
together.

Certain non-scholastics and the Ontologists them-

selves,3 of course, accept the argument as ontologistic and
yet valid.

The opinions of a few scholastic authors may well

be reviewed.
In the forefront of those who oppose the argument is
Descoqs.

He does not quitewant to call St. Augustine an

Ontologist, at least in the Doctor's use of this argument; but
he insinuates all along that the argument is surely ontological
and probably ontologistic.

In regard to the former point, he

agrees with the observation of Gilson that the proof prepares,
because it formally implies, the ontological argument of St.
Anselm.4 He says:
C'est aussi bien la pensee qui a inspir:
toute notre critique de cette preuve par

2
3

4

Descoqs, Praelectiones, I, 609.
As Leibniz in his Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humain,
IV, 11; and Malebranche in Recherc~de la VefritJ, III, 7, 2.
Gilson, Introduction, 28.

,
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,

les idees eternelles: qu'on le veuille ou
non, l'argument implique le procede anselmien, il se ramene en d~finitive et
fatalement
l'argument ontologique.5

a

Concerning the question of whether the proof is
ontologistic, he is not so certain.

He admits that it is a

valid proof for one who holds the Platonic ideas and
illumination, but doubts that it otherwise has any force at all.
Although he does not settle the question, he does express
concern that St. Augustine used such expressions as: "Deus lux
est in qua omnia cognoscimus, 11 and " ••• in ipsa, quae supra
mentem est, incommutabili veritate omnia cognoscimus."

While.

leaving the question to others for settlement, Descoqs indicates
that he believes that the proof is ontologistic as well as
ontological.6
Loinaz also opposes the argument on the grounds of
principium petit, inasmuch as the eternal existence of the
truths appealed to can only be granted if it is already known
that God exists.
Sane omnis veritas, omnia possibilitas
fundari debet in Deo exsistente; sine quo
proin neutrum dari poterit. Extra hanc
hypothesim nee verum nee falsum aderit,
sed absolutum nihil. Brevi: Maior
argumenti aprioristice, si Deus non

5
6

Descoqs, Praelectiones, II, 132.
Ibid.
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supponatur, falsa est. Hinc Deus demonstretur ex exsistentibus; quod sufficit.7
Mercier notes that, given the possibles, the relations
which govern them and the truth of these relations are
independent of time and space.

However, the possibles are not

given, unless it is already supposed that God exists and knows
them.

He summarizes his criticism of the argument:
En resuml, aucune essence possible n'est
necessaire en elle-m&le absolument. La
seule chose necessaire, c'est que, pos~
l'existence soit dans la nature, soit dans
la pensee humaine, d'une essence donnee,
il se produise entre les el~ments qui la
constituent, des rapports nicessaires de
compatibilit' et d'incompatibilite: bref,
la necessite des possibles est une .
necessite conditionelle de rapports.B

He then concludes that the theory according to which God
would be the sufficient reason of the possibles and of their
properties "aboutit logiquement )t l'ontologisme."9
De Mondadon flatly denies that the argument of St.
Augustine has anything in common with the arguments of St.
Anselm10 and Descartes, or with the ideological argument of

7
8
9
10

Loinaz, Praelectiones e Theologia Naturali, 82.
Mercier, Metaphysique 'G6nerale, 44.
Ibid., 49.
In this de Mondadon directly sets himself against J. Martin,
who maintained that the Augustinian argument was a prelude
to the Anselmian. Cf. J. Martin, Saint Augustin,
Librairie J:i'elix Alcan, Paris, 1923, 99-109.
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Bossuet and Leibniz.

He says that those are mistaken (as

Malebranche and Leibniz) who would find in St. Augustine texts
to prove their own ontologistic doctrine.

However, he adds

a wise observation:
Nous pouvons, cependant, reprocher ~ saint
Augustin de n'avoir pas assez distingu{ au
net les divers aspects de la vlrite extramentale, accord objectif de la pens~e avec
son terme, fondements concrets des representations abstraites, exemplaire ~ternel
des ~tres, cause premi~re des actes
intellectuels. De 1~ ses apparentes
concessions
1 1 ontologisme. Platonicien,
intuitif et orateur, il n'a pas assez
surveill~, pas assez controle son
/
raisonnement; il court d 1 un elan
fougueux,
on ne le suit plus et on fait fausse route. 11

a

Although Descoqs tries to find an ally in Gilson, it does
not appear that the latter would go so far as the former.

For

Gilson finds that the proof is complete, being based upon the
principle of sufficient reason.

Moreover, he clearly denies

that it is ontologistic.

,..

,..

Mais il apparait de meme coup qu 1 en
decouvrant
ainsi la transcendance de la
I
verite,
c'est
1 1 existence de Dieu que la
.I
pensee decouvre, puisque ce qu'elle apercoit
au-dessus de l'homme, cI 1 est de 1 1 eternel,
"
\
de l'immuable, et du necessaire, c 1 est-adire une realite qui poss~de tous les
attributs de Dieu lui-m~me. Non pas, sans
doute, qu'en voyant la v~rite dans sa propre
pensee, l'~e voie l'essence meme de Dieu.
Elle n'atteint pas alors le terme dont la
~

~

11

De Mondadon, "De la Connaissance
de Soi-m&ne ~ la
Connaissance de Dieu, 11 156.
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possession lui conf~rerait la b~atitude,
mais elle \voit du moins quel terme il
lui reste a atteindre pour jouir de cette
b~atitude et entrer dans son repos.l2
On the other hand, he admits that the proof leads to
the metaphysical speculation of St. Anselm, but qualifies
this statement.
A

~

C'est pourquoi, de meme qu 1 elle prepare
sous son premier aspect le symbolisme
medi6val du monde
sensible, envisag~e
\
sous ce deux}eme aspect'l elle ouvre la
voie aux speculations metaphysiques d'un
saint Anselme, qui cherchent h decouvrir
1 1 existence de Dieu dans l'idee m~me que
nous avons de lui. Non qu'il ait developpe
cette preuve, mais saint Augustin n'en
avai t po.s moins certainement engage la
recherche dans une direction qui conduisait no~alement 'a la preuve de
Proslogion. 3
It is Boyer who defends the argument most often and most
at length.

.B'irst he points out that the larger number of

authors do not find in St. Augustine the teaching of an immediate vision of God in our natural knowledge.l4

He goes on to

say that the two questions are always distinct; hence he

12

13
14

Gilson, Introduction, 21-22. Furthermore, he states on
page 1~3: "Ainsi done, de quelque point de vue qu' on la
considere,
l'illumination augustinienne ne saurait/ etre
/
/
interpretee comme une intuition du contenu des idees
de Dieu."
Ibid., 28.
Boyer, Essais, 50: 11 Le plus grand nombre des auteurs se
refusent a , trouver dans saint Augustin l'enseignement d'une
vision immediate de Dieu dans la connaissance naturelle."
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considers the proof apart from the question of ontologism.
Nor can anyone correctly argue, he says, (as some,l5 relying on
the famous passage in the Confessiones,l6 have done) that
Augustine taught two kinds of knowledge of God: one direct and
imrnediate, the other mediate in the mirror of the human soul.
Il n'y a done d'objet immediat
pour notre
1'/
esprit que des objets crees. Le plus
parfait de ces,objets 1 celui qui nous
aide le mieux a conna~tre Dieu, c'est
l'ime humaine dans l'acte de la charitt.l7
Again in the schematic presentation of the proof, which
he gives in his book L'Id6e de Verit~ dans la Philosophie de
Saint Augustin, Boyer endeavors to show that the proof is not
ontological.

His whole strenuous defense of it is intended to

prove its validity.

He also denies that the argument is

ontologistic, concluding with these words:
/

C'est done, croyons-nous, s'egarer que de
voir dhns la preu~e de Dieu, chez saint
Augustin, l'expose, soit du systeme de la
vision en Dieu, comme l'a fait Malebranche,
soit de l'intuition immediate de Dieu,
telle que l'ont comgrise les ontologistes
du dernier si~cle.l

15
16
17
18

Boyer himself names Ambrosius Victor, :Malebranche, and
Hessen.
Confesaiones, VII, 10, 16; PL 32, 742: "Intravi, et vidi
qualicumque oculo animae meae, supra eundem oculum animae
meae supra mentem meam, lucem incommutabilem ••• "
Boyer, Essa~a, 90.
Boyer, L'Idee, 70-71.
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Along with these defenders of St. Augustine's proof may
be named Hontheim, who in his Institutiones Theodicaeae gives
a long defense,l9 Bossuet,20 Fenelon,21 Leibniz,22 Kleutgen,23
Sertillanges,24 Garrigou-Lagrange,25 and others.

They are

listed here that we may see how great is the controversy on
this matter.
In giving my own opinion on this difficult question, I
should like to call attention to the distinction made in the
introductory remarks of this chapter.

'fhe proof may be

ontological (that is, involve an illegitimate jump from the
ideal to the real order) without being ontologistic (that is,
without implying a direct vision of God).

For it seems to me

that the proof is ontological objectively, and yet not
ontologistic.
To take up the latter problem first, it seems well to
remark with de Mondadon that St. Augustine was not always
careful to guard his remarks in such a way as to prevent

19

20
21
22
23
24
25

Joseph Hontheim, S.J., Institutiones Theodicaeae, Herder,'
Friburg, 1893, 128-139. So on 132: "Neque tamen cum
quibusdam exsistimandum est ex mente s. Augustini ipsum
Deum esse objectum, quod intelligentia nostra directe
contemplatur, quando vera pronuntiat."
Connaissance de Dieu et de Soi-meme, IV, 5.
Traitl de l 1 Eirstenee-ae-oieu, I, 2, 50; II, 3, 49.
Nouveaui:Essais sur l'Elltenaement Humain, IV, 11.
Phi1osophie SchoiiStique, IV, 11, 4.
"L'Idee de Dieu et 1a V~rite," in Revue Thomiste, sept.,
1940.
Dieu, 296-302.
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misunderstanding.

We may cite two outstanding examples which

taken together surely allow misinterpretation.

Augustine says

that he sees the unchangeable light above his intellect, and
again identifies this light with God.
writes:

11

In the Conf'essiones, he

Intravi, et vidi qualicumque oculo animae meae supra

eundem oculum animae meae supra mentem meam, lucem incommutabilem."26

And in the De Vera Religione: "Nee jam illud

ambigendum est, incommutabilem naturam, quae supra rationalem
animam sit, Deum esse.rr27

That this is dangerous language may

be granted; that it is a proof' that the argument is ontologistic
need not be granted.
The first fact to be considered is this: St. Augustine
regularly calls for faith in God's existence, even when he is
about to prove the same point by reason.

In the De Vera

Religione, the sections leading up to the proof discuss what
faith has to tell us about the existence and nature of God.
the De Libero Arbitrio, at the outset he asks:

11

In

Illud saltern

tibi certum est, Deum esse"; and Evodius replies: "Etiam hoc
non contemplando, sed credendo inconcussum teneo.n28

But it is

at once evident that, where there is faith, there is no room
for an immediate vision of God, which would exclude faith.

26
27
28

Conf'essiones, VII, 10, 16; PL 32, 742.
De Vera Reiigione, 31, 57; PL 34, 147.
De LIOero Ar itrio, II~ 2, 5; PL 32, 1242.
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Ontologists such as Malebranche may have faith in revelation
and mysteries, but they cannot logically have faith in the
existence of God.

It is faith in precisely this fact which

Augustine demands at the outset of his argument.

Moreover, the

question of the respective positions of faith and reason is so
prominent in St. Augustine thet it can hardly be argued that
he would be unaware of the inconsistency of demanding faith in
the existence of that which we intuit.

Therefore, in his very

demand for faith the great Doctor shows how far opposed he is
to ontologiam.
Secondly, the principle on which the philosophical proof
is baaed is, as we have endeavored to prove, the principle of
sufficient reason.

It is granted that in pious and rhetorical

passages St. Augustine does not speak with philosophical
precision,

~nd

so may seem to hold a direct intuition of God.

Nevertheless, in the discussion in the De Libero Arbitrio, he
argues by psychological method to those truths of which God is
the sole sufficient reason.

He does not argue: "We have a

direct vision of God; therefore we know that He exists."
laborious process rather excludes this direct vision.

His

The

argumentation is not to the psychological "fact" that we
directly intuit God.

It is rather to the fact that we recognize

above our minds eternal and immutable truths; the changeable
mind cannot be the explanation of these truths; therefore, God
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must exist as the only reason sufficient to explain their
existence.

Again, then, we must conclude that the argument is

not ontologistic.
Finally, St. Augustine in the De Trinitate endeavors to
explain st. Paul's words:

11

We see now through a glass in a dark

manner: but then face to face.n29

He realizes that the true

explanation can only be that God is seen, not directly, but in
something which "reflects" Him.

He seeks those things which

may provide the best reflection.
Quale sit et quod sit hoc speculum, si
quaeramus, profecto illud occurrit, quod
in speculo nisi imago cernitur. Hoc ergo
facere conati sumus, ut per imaginem hanc
quod nos sumus, videremus utcumque a quo
facti sumus, tamquam per speculum.30
This is the reason why it may be said that Augustine,
while employing elements of the classical proofs for God's
existence, really considered them all part of his one
He is seeking the mirror in which he may see God.

proo~.

Working

~rom

sensible creatures, he arrives at God by means of the argument
from causality, by means of the order in the universe, etc.
But the mirror in which he best sees God is the human soul
itself.

As Boyer summarizes it,
Il n•y a done d'objet imnH~diat pour notre

29
30

I Corinthians, 13/12.
De Trinitate, XV, 8, 14; PL 42, 1067.

,
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esprit que des objets crees. Le plus
parfait de ces,objets~ celui qui nous
aide le mieux a conna~tre Dieu, c'est
l'ame humaine dans l'acte de la charit~.31
It has been shown that this is the route which st.
Augustine follows in the argument as we have presented it from
his works.

However, such a route--long and slow and tedious--

is entirely unnecessary if one bas an immediate vision of God.
The words of St. Paul, moreover, are not explained if we see
"face to face" here below, even though in a less perfect manner
than we shall see God in heaven.

Again, it appears that we

must come to the same conclusion; namely, that the argument
is not ontologistic.
There remains, however, the other question of whether or
not the proof is ontological.
opinion in this matter.
the proof

~

ontological.

We have noted the divergence of

I have stated that, in my opinion,
It is time now to give the reasons

for that opinion.
In the course of his argument, St. augustine proceeds from
inanimate creatures, to brutes, to rational beings.
that the highest thing in man is his reason.

He shows

He proves that,

above reason, there exist eternal and immutable truths.

These

truths, he says, are above reason because reason realizes that

31

Boyer, Essais, 90.
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it does not judge them, but judges according to them; and
because the mutable intellect cannot produce or explain
immutable truth.

He concludes that God exists.

\Ve have shown

that this conclusion must rest on the fact that God alone is
the sufficient reason to explain the existence of these truths.
rt seems to me that this procedure involves a leap from the
logical order to the real.32
For whence come these truths, with their characteristics
of universality, eternity, and immutability?
said that they exist above our intellects?

How can it be
If these truths are

taken materially, as abstracted from the real order by the
intellect, they do not require the existence of God as their

32

In Augustine's own system this is not necessarily true. If
he did not hold abstraction in the Thomistic sense, the
proof would not be ontological for him. This point is
taken up later. For the presen~c~Thonnard, Precis
d'Histoire de la Philosophie, 214-215: 11 Mais ce passage
obligatoireparnotre
esprit suscite une objection contre
,
la valeur de la demonstration augustinienne: en s'appuyant
sur le caractere de nos id~es, n'est-elle pas un passage
ill~gitime du logique-iu r~el? ••• mais saint Augustin
echappe \ l'objection, car il ne se base aucunement sur
nos id~es ab~traites, ignorant totalement l'abstraction.
Les v~ri tes etei·nelles expriment pour lui le fait de
notre vie intellectuelle saisi par l'intuition-Qe la
conscience, avec toutes ses richesses d'~tre, resumant
pour ainsi dire et concentrant en soi la realite des
degres inferieurs qu'elle juge et regle. Le~assage
ill~gitime du logique au rlel est done bien evite et
la preuve augustinienne, sans gtre parfaitement reductible
aux cadres thomistes, garde sa pleine valeur de demonstration rationnelle." Although not wholly agreeing with
this reasoning, we think it worthy of note here.
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sufficient reason.

For, given the abstractive power of the

intellect, given the ess€nces of finite things which actually
are particular, temporal, mutable, and contingent, one can
abstract from individuating notes and from real existence.
these essences are, in their ideal
immutable, and necessary.

~,

Then

universal, eternal,

But they do not require the eternal

and immutable God as the sufficient reason for their existence.
It is true, as Descoqs points out and as certain defenders of
the a_rgument attempt to do, that the proof' may be reduced to
the argument from contingency (if' these truths are taken as
contingent essences abstracted from contingent existing beings),
or to the argument from the grades of being (if these truths
are taken in themselves as determined, finite realities).
reduced it is a valid argument.

So

However, it seems that st.

Augustine himself does not argue in this way.
On the other hand, if these truths are taken formally-that is, only in the ideal and intelligible order--and if the
argument is taken as complete in itself, there seems to be an
illegitimate transfer from the ideal to the real order.

For

these truths necessarily imply a relation to some mind, either
human or divine.

But since, by hypothesis, it is not yet

certain that God exists, then such truths imply a relation only
to the human intellect and have their sufficient reason in
our intellect and in things.

If they exist from eternity, then
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there must be a mind knowing them from eternity.

But the

eternity of these truths is acquired only by the abstraction
made from really existing things by the human mind, under the
supposition that we do not yet know whether or not God exists.
Hence, if one concludes from this truth, as abstracted by the
hmnan intellect and therefore in the ideal order only, to the
real existence of God, one falls into the ontological error.
This the argument, if taken in itself, seems to do.

And it has

been demonstrated elsewhere that the argument should be taken
as complete in itself.
It might be added that, granted the existence of God
proved in some other way, the argument can be used to demonstrate that eternal truths have only in God the sufficient
reason for their existence.

However, it is precisely this

supposition which one arguing to the existence of God cannot
make.
For the conclusion of this section, a short summary is in
order.

It has been shown that there has been controversy on

two points concerning this proof.

Some have held that the

argument is ontologistic, that St. Augustine must have taught
that we have a direct vision of God.
to prove this point.

They have adduced texts

In reply, we have endeavored to show

that Augustine's thought is not ontologistic, although his
words are somewhat careless at times.

Specifically, we have
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tried to prove that this proof is not ontologistic.
.
Secondly, some authors defend the validity of the proof,
while others say that, if taken as a separate proof, it is an
ontological argument.

After giving several opinions on both

sides, we attempted to demonstrate that the proof is ontological.

It follows, of course, that the proof is--again in

my opinion--invalid.33

33

Of. Palumbo, 'rheodicea, 213-222. The author gives an
admirable summary of the proof, the position and reasons
of both those who defend the argument and those who oppose
it. I have drawn on him heavily for the last part of
this section.

CHAPTER VI
DEPENDENCE ON

THE DOCTRINE O!t' ILLUMINATION

Having concluded our discussion of' the validity of St.
Augustine's argument, we might perhaps logically proceed at once
to some remarks on the spirit animating it.

However, there is

another question so closely connected with this proof that we
cannot overlook it.

Does the proof depend on the Augustinian

doctrine of illumination?

Are the two distinct?

These are the

questions which underlie the discussion in this chapter.
Briefly, the doctrine of illumination which St. Augustine
proposed is this: in order to know anything, our human intellect
must receive a mysterious influence from God, an illumination of
some sort, in the light of which it knows the truth.

Time and

again Augustine explains the origin of our ideas and our
intellectual knowledge in this way.

After he had rejected the

Neoplatonic theory of reminiscence, he developed this theory of
his own, often using metaphors to bring out his meaning.

God is

the sun of the soul,l its interior master,2 the light in which

1

Soliloquiorum Libri Duo, I, 8, 15; PL 32, 877: "Ergo et illa
quae in disciplinis traduntur, quae quisquis intelligit,
verissima esse nulla dubitatione concedit, credendum est ea
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we see all things.3

In the De Civitate Dei, the Word is called

the light of the soul, even for the acquisition of natural
knowledge, which Augustine is there discussing.4
Now it must be admitted that this doctrine is interpreted
in several different ways.

Complete discussion of the doctrine

lies outside the scope of this paper.
interpretations will be presented.

However, some of the

A brief refutation will be

made of some; the reasons for adopting the interpretation
followed will be stated.
First, there is the pantheistic interpretation, which
would make st. Augustine an Averroist.

2

3
4

According to this

non posse intelligi, nisi ab alio quasi sole illustrentur."
De Magistro, 12, 40; PL 32, 1217: neum vero de iis agitur
quae mente conspicimus, id est intellectu atque ratione,
ea quidem loquimur quae praesentia contuemur in illa
interiore luce veritatis, qua ipse qui dicitur homo interior,
illustratur et furitur: sed tunc quoque noster auditor, si
et ipse illa secreto ac simplici oculo videt; novit quod
dico sua contemplatione, non verbis meis. Ergo ne hunc
quidem doceo vera dicens, vera intuentem, docetur enim non
verbis meis, sed ipsis rebus, Deo intus pandente,
manifestis. 11
De Genesi ad Litteram, XII, 31, 59; PL 34, 479: "Aliud
autem est IPsum lumen quo illustratur anima ut omnia vel
in se vel in illo veraciter intellects conspiciat."
De Civitate Dei, X, 2; PL 41, 2'79: "In qua differentia
Sit!s ostenditur, animam rationalem vel intellectualem,
qualis erat in Joanne, sibi lumen esse non posse, sed
alterius veri luminis participatione lucere. Hoc et ipse
Joannes fatetur, ubi ei perhibens testimonium dicit: 'Nos
omnes de plenitudine ejus accepimus.'" This is given as a
comment on the opening verses of the Gospel according to
st. John.
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interpretation, God, as universal intellect, would see the
truth in us and we in Him.

Since Augustine rejects eternal

creation (as in the De Civitate Dei)5 and yet holds creation
~ nihilo (as in the De Vera Religione),6 a pantheistic

explanation of his system is impossible.
Malebranche, J:t,enelon, and Bossuet, among others, have put
an ontologistic interpretation on the doctrine of illumination.7
They say that Augustine taught that our soul sees God Himself
and in Him the divine ideas.

However, as we have already shown

in the previous chapter, St. Augustine clearly rejected any
direct vision of God.

The very metaphors he used in exposing

his system indicate, not that it is God Himself \¥ho is seen,
but rather

t~at

other things are known because of some influence

of God on the human soul.

Portalie sums up the case against

a position which we shall not again refute at length:
D'apr~s saint Augustin, Dieu soleil de

ltftme, n'apparaft jamais comme un objet
que nous voyons, mais comme un agent qui
produit en notre ~e ce par quoi nous
pouvons connaftre:aA third interpretation is offered by the scholastic

5
6
7
8

De Civitate Dei, X, 31; PL 41, 311-312; and XI, 6, PL 41,
322: "Cum tempore autem factus est mundus."
De Vera Religione, 18, 35, PL 04, 137: "Unde fecit? Ex

nib!'I'O:""

Places cited in previous chapter.
Portalie, "Saint Augustin, 11 DTC, I, 2335. In this section
we have borrowed much f'rom tEIS excellent article.
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school, proposed by such men as Zigliari, Franzelin, and
Lepidi.9

According to them, God is the light of the intellect

inasmuch as He is its creative cause and the source'and exemplar
of all truth.

rrhis interpretation of St. Augustine seems

insufficient.

In the first place, although the Bishop of

Hippo would certainly accept the two statements, he said more
than they say.

He was striving constantly for an explanation

of the problem of knowledge.

Merely to maintain that God

created the human intellect and that He is the source of truth,
does not solve this problem.
the truth?

How does the human mind arrive at

That is what he wanted to explain.

And he intro-

duced his doctrine of illumination precisely in order to provide
the answer to this further question.

The texts already cited--

.

and this is the second point--indicate that God, in addition to
creating our intellect, must continually illuminate it that it
may know the truth.

Hence, if we may believe that St. Augustine

offered any solution to the problem of knowledge, it seems that

9

Zigliari in Della Luce Intellectuale, I, 11-13; Franzelin in
De Deo Uno, 140-14s;-Lepid1 in J)e Ontologismo, 192-225.
Boyer-in-Eis Essais admits that-xugustine and Aristotle
follow different routes, but maintains that, after all, they
are not so very far apart in the end result. So p. 163:
"Vraimer;t quelque di verses qu' a).ent ~te les voies parcourues,
la difference au point d'arrivee est minima, s'il y en a
une ••• 11 Cf. the whole chapter on "Saint ·J:homas et Saint
Augustin." Descoqst criticism of' Boyer for attempting to
reconcile St. ~ugustine and St. Thomas in this matter
(Praelectiones, I, 557-559), while perhaps 'harsh, seems
to me to be sound.
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we must reject this interpz·etation as inadequate.
A final interpretation is offered here.
Portali~

It is that of

and the one followed in this discussion.

It maintains

that the action of God in our intellectual knowledge does not
consist in His showing Himself to us, but in producing in our
minds an image of the truth.
On peut la formuler ainsi: Notre hle ne peut
atteindre a la verite intellectuelle, sans
une influence mysterieuse de Dieu, ne
consistant point a se montrer lui-meme a
nous (objective), mais ~ produire (effective)
Dans
notre
~e comme une image de ces
I
I
I
verites
qui determine
notre connaissance.
En langage scolastique, le role que les
aristoteliciens attribuent
l•intellect
agent qui produit les species impressae,
ce systeme l'attribue a Dieu: Lui, le
maitre, il parlerait a l'ame, en ce sens
qu'il imprimerait cette representation
des vlri t~s e'ternell es qui serai t la /
cause de notre connaissance. Les idees
ne seraient pas inn6es comme dans lea
anges, mais successivement produites dans
l'~e qui les conna1trait en elle-mgme.lO

a

Does this proof for the existence of God have an essential
dependence on St. Augustine's theory of illumination as
interpreted above?
dependence.

Descoqs seems to maintain such an essential

For, in his sketch of the proof, he explains

that st. Augustine argued directly from the illumination of the
soul by God to the existence of God.

10

I
Portalie,
nsaint Augustin,n DTC, I, 2336.
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Cette rapidite/ avec laquelle s. Augustin
expose l'essentiel de sa preuve, montre
qu'il la tient pour 6vidente: et d'ailleurs
est-ce bien une
preuve, si par ce mot on
I
entend une deduction
logique qui nous conduit
a la certitude? Si la pensee humaine est
sans cease sous l'action de la lumi~re
divine, comme le suppose s. Augustin, et
si, sans elle,-elle ne peUt rien conna1tre,
tout homme, par le fait m~me qu 1 il m~ne
une vie raisonnable, est en contact ~troit
avec Dieu, il en a dej~ une connaissance
implicite. Il lui suffira done de refl{chir sur lui-meme, sur son activite
intellectuelle, pour prendre aussit8t
conscience de sa dependance
l'egard de
la v6rite divine et done de l'existence de
cette
verite sans laquelle il ne pourrait
.1\
meme
pas penser. Ainsi 1 1 existence de
Dieu nous est plutSt livree par une analyse
pscyhologique gue par un veritable
raisonnement.li

a

Gilson agrees that the two--this proof and illumination-are essentially connected in St. Augustine.

He gives his

reason:
/
/
'
Il est d'abord evident
par ce qui precede
[an outline of the proof] que 1 'on ne
saurait
distinguer chez saint Augustin le
\
probleme de l'existence de Dieu du
probleme.
de la connaissance; c'est une
'
seule et meme question de savoir co~ent
nous concevons la verite
et de connaitre
/
l'existence de la Verite, aussi la preuve
s'accomplit-elle toute entiere a l'interieur
de la pensee, sans que la considlration de
1 1 ordre sensible doive obligatoirement
intervenir.l2
/

11
12

Descoqs, Praelectiones, II, 131.
Gilson, Introduction, 23-24.
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While not stating his

,

opi~ion

precisely about this

proof, Portalie, seems to come to the same conclusion.

For he

says that the question of illumination is of the first
importance in St. Augustine,

11

especially because of the role

which this theory plays in the augustinian system: it is not
an isolated problem, it is a part, an aspect, of the great
general problem of our dependence upon God.ul3

In other words,

he would favor the opinion upholding the essential connection
of the two questions.
Boyer, on the other hand, maintains that the two are
distinct.

In his consideration of the proof, he deliberately

separates the one question from the other, observing that,
although one may cast light on the other, they should be
treated separately.
Afin de dtcrire avec exactitude la mani~re
dont saint Augustin a prouve Dieu, il faut
d;gager constamment cette question de
plusieurs autres qui l'accompagnent
d'ordinaire dans les textes. Etablir que
Dieu est, ce n'est pas expliquer comment
nous connaissons Dieu, ni comment il agit
sur notre intelligence, ni quel rapport
il soutient avec les autres ~tres, ni
meme comment il est. Les th~ories de la
vision de Dieu, de l'illumination, de la
participation, de l'essence divine, se
rencontrent souvent, soit toutes ensemble

13

Portali6', "Saint Augustin," DTC, I, 2334: " ••• surtout 1
cause du r~le que joue cette~eorie ·dans le systeme·
augustinien: ce n'est pas un probleme isol{, c'est une
partie, un aspect du grand probleme general de notre
dlpendance de Dieu."
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soit l'une ou l'autre d'entre elles, dans
la meme
"' page que la preuve de l'existence
de Dieu. Parce qu'elles sont connexes, on
est tente de les confondre. Sans doute,
elles s'eclairent l'une l'autre,
mais
/
I
seulement quand chacune a ete rendue
lumineuse pour sa part. \ Sinon, la synth~se
est trouble, et le systeme encombre de
difficul tes .14
~

.

This sampling of opinions should indicate that this point
too is as much controverted as are the other questions concerned
with this proof.

Dut what conclusions may be drawn from the

argument itself?
In the first place, it should be noted that St. Augustine
himself does not explicitly introduce his theory of illumination
into the argument.

He begins the proof in the De Libero

Arbitrio by demonstrating that the human mind is capable of
knowing truth.
Quare prius abs te quaere, ut de manifestissimis capiamus exordium; utrum tu
ipse sis. An tu fortasse metuis, ne in
hac interrogatione fallaris, cum utique
si non esses, falli omnino non posses?l5
But note that he makes no appeal to the doctrine of illumination
to establish this fact.

14

15

Again, he arrives at the point where

Boyer, L'Id6e, 49. Cf. also Essais, 51-53: "Cornme toutefois
les deux questions sont de soi distinctes, nous ne
considererons directement dans ces pages que la preuve de
Dieu, et nous negligerons les controverses qui portent
d'emblee sur l'illumination."
De Libero Arbitrio, II, 3, 7; PL 32, 1243.
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the mind recognizes eternal truth above itself.
mind get at this truth?
here.

How does the

Augustine does not answer the question

He states it as a fact of psychological experience: "It

is sufficiently clear that above our mind there is a law which
is ~alled truth.ul6

Nor in any other place in his proof does

he explicitly advance his answer to the problem of knowledge.
However, it should be noted that, in the second place,
St. Augustine must have used his doctrine implicitly; that is,
he presumed its validity throughout his proof.

I

As Portalie

says, illumination is not an isolated doctrine; it runs through
all the speculations of the great Doctor.

A priori, we might

say that he would not abandon it in this particular demonstration.

Of course, he could not mention it explicitly,

because to say that God illumines our intellect is to presume
what is to be proved; namely, that God exists.

However, when we

examine the proof, we see that Augustine chose to proceed by
way of the mind, first demonstrating briefly the ability of the
mind to know truth.

He is not concerned here to explain how

the mind gets at the truth; but it seems certain that, if
questioned, he would give the answer he so often gave elsewhere--his doctrine of' illumination.

Since the whole proof

proceeds through the mind to get at something above the mind,

16

~Vera

Religione, 30, 56; PL 34, 147.
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since this something above the mind is truth, since the mind
knows this truth--since all this is so, it seems clear!_
posteriori that St. Augustine implicitly employed his illumination theory even in the proof for the existence of God.
It must be admitted, nevertheless, that even this implicit
use of the theory does not as yet prove any essential dependence
of the proof upon it.

Whether there is such an essential

connection is a further question.
But first let us make one point clear.

Descoqs implies

that st. Augustine argued from his theory of illumination to
the existence of God.

According to Descoqs, Augustine says

that every man has an implicit knowledge of God; by reflection
on his own intellectual activity he learns of his dependence
upon the divine truth and then of the existence of this truth
without which he would not even be able to think.
know truth and justice?
illumine us.l7

Why do we

Because the divine truth and justice

In this way Descoqs seems to argue that

Augustine used his very doctrine of illumination to prove the
existence of God.

vVhether or not this is really the sense of

Descoqs' words, the fact clearly stands that such a procedure
would be invalid.

17

It would be a vicious circle to advance' a

Descoqs, Praelectiones, II, 131: "Comment discerner ce
qui est Juste de ce qui ne l'est pas, si la justice infinie
ne nous 'claire?"
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theory of knowledge which implies the existence of God, and
then to demonstrate the existence of God by means of this
theory.

However, there is no evidence that St. Augustine

proceeds in this way.

He first es-tablishes the ability of the

mind to grasp truth, independently of any theory as to how the
mind grasps it.

Then, again independently of any theory, he

appeals to the fact that the mind recognizes immutable truth
above itself.

Finally, he shows that God must exist if this

truth exists.

In the whole procedure, be it noted, he argues

to and from facts, but not from his theory of illumination.
Nevertheless, it seems to me that there is, in Augustine's
mind and method, an essential connection of this proof for the
existence of God and the solution of the problem of knowledge
by illumination.

It was pointed out in the previous chapter

that this proof is ontological if taken as a separate argument.
Whereas Augustine argues from the existence of immutable and
eternal truth to the existence of God as--so we think--the
sufficient reason for this truth; in a Thomistic explanation
the theory of abstraction would account for the immutability,
eternity, and universality of truth, given sensible things and
the abstractive power of the mind.

For it was noted that, if

one argued from the existence of' truth as abstracted by the
mind and so in the ideal order, to the real existence of God,
then one would fall into the ontological error.

It appeared
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that, objectively, Augustine had fallen into this error.
However, his method seems to indicate that he did not wish to
take this truth

~

complete in itself.

abstracted, and yet regarded his proof as
If in his solution to the problem of

knowledge there is no abstractive process by which truths in
the ideal order would be universal and immutable; if the only
explanation is that these truths must have God as the sufficient
reason for their universality and iwnutability; in that
hypothesis the argument would be valid.

Therefore, if St.

Augustine assumed in his proof the validity of his illumination
theory, a

theo1~y

in which there would be no abstraction in the

Thomistic sense;l8 then for him the argwnent would be valid.
No other explanation than this latter (barring simple error on
Augustine's part) seems adequate.

Consequently, both to his

mind and in fact the proof has an essential dependence on the
doctrine of' illumination.l9

18

19

Boyer, Essais, ch. 5 and 6, attempts to show that Augustine
actually did hold abstraction in the Thomistic sense, or at
least that this is not incompatible with his doctrine.
Descoqs remarks: " ••• la these du P. Boyer sur le thomisme
de s. Augustin et le possibilite de ramener sa theorie de la
connaissance ~ l 1 abstraction aristotelico-thomiste, est de
plus en plus battue en br'hche." (Praelectiones, I, 559.)
Descoqs, Praelectiones, II, 132-133: flpour qui adopte la
metaphysique platonicienne du monde des intelligibles et des
idees, ou pour qui admet deja Dieu et l'illumination du
Verbe, une telle maniere de voir vaut sans doute; mais pour
qui n'admet pas cette met~hysique des idees, ou ne tient
pas encore Dieu, il est bien evident que la preuve qui
s'y appuie n'a plus la meme force, si meme elle en conserve
aucune."
~

~
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Before concluding this chapter, it might be well to
remark with Portalie that st. Augustine's doctrine of illumination is still a free theological opinion, which may be used
to solve the problem of knowledge.
respect.

st~

Thomas treated it with

Suarez comrnented that in so obscure a matter liberty

remains for the theologian.

Illustrious men, particularly of

the school of st. Bonaventure, have defended it.

Although it

does not seem even probable philosophically today, it has had
considerable historical importance.
In summary, these points may be set down.
illumination has been variously interpreted.

The theory of

The interpretation

here followed is that which explains God's influence in intellectual knowledge as the production of an image of the truth
in the human mind.

Although the question of the essential

connection of this proof with the doctrine of illumination is
controverted, this conclusion seems valid from a study of the
proof itself: St. Augustine does not argue from his theory to
the existence of God, but in his method there is an essential
connection between the two.

CF~TER

VII

THE SPIRIT OF THE PROOF
Although the logical steps and principles of St.
Augustine's proof have been sufficiently analyzed, there remain
to be discussed certain characteristics or features of this
proof which indicate the spirit in which it was conceived and
set down.
One characteristic stroke of St. Augustine's pen is the
discursive nature of the argument.

In the first chapter a

complete account of the proof and the parts of the De Libero
Arbitrio preceding it was set down.

There were seen all the

nuances, the short halts, the rhetorical flourishes, in which
st. Augustine seemed to take delight.

There is the step-by-step

procedure from inanimate things all the way up to the intellectual soul and above.

There is the slow build-up, beginning

with a demand for faith in God's existence and a demonstration
of the ability of the mind to attain truth.l
questioning method and a

concretiz~ng

of the problem, the

effective practical method of the apologist.

1

There is the

There is the pause

De Libero Arbitrio, II, 2-3, 5-7; PL 32, 1242-1244.
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to praise Wisdom and to urge Evodius to embrace it--and this in
flowing rhetoric.2

There is all the sinuousness of a majestic

river flowing to its outlet.

In fact, the whole proof is

inserted into a discussion of free will and the origin of evil.
Not for Augustine the short, sharp strokes of the scholastic
syllogism, not even in this work where he deliberately sets
himself to demonstrate by reason the existence of God.

De

Mondadon gives a good description of this method:
I
Soit qu'il la developpe
en un dialogue avec
son ami Evodius ••• travers l'entrecroisement
des reflexions, soit qu'il la resserre •••
'
I
en quelques phrases d'une brievete
musculeuse
et comme fremissant.e, jamais il ne manque
d'y mettre une richesse de nuances que ne
laisserait point soupgonner le lucide
raccourci de la forme scolastique.3

a

Moreover, in presentations of the proof in other works,
st. Augustine becomes even more rhetorical.
~,4

In the Confessi-

which we will have occasion to quote below, in sermons

and discourses, or in the De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII,5
he demonstrates that style which is the wonder and despair of
those who read him.

For example:

Omne quod est, aut eodem modo semper est,
aut non. Et omnia anima omni corpore
melior est. Melius est enim omne quod
2
3

4
5

Ibid., II, 13-14, 35-38; PL 32, 1260-1262.
JelMondadon, "De la Connaissance de Soi-m~me de la
Connaissance de Dieu," 148.
Confessiones, VII, 10, 16; PL 32, 742.
De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII, q. 45; PL 40, 28-29; and
q7 54; PL 40, 38.

91

vivificat, quam id quod vivificatur: corpus
autem ab anima vivificari, non a corpore
animam nemo ambigit. ~od autem corpus non
est, et tamen a1 iquid est, aut anima est,
aut ea melius aliquid. Deterius enim omni
corpore nihil est: quia et si materiam quia
dixerit, unde ipsum corpus fit; recte,
quoniam caret omni specie, nihil dicitur •••
Si quid enim esset medium, aut vivificaretur
ab anima, aut vivificaret animam, aut
neutrum: aut vivificaret corpus aut vivificaretur a corpore aut neutrum.6
Perhaps even more characteristic of St. Augustine's
method is the psychological approach here employed.

.~.·he

proof

begins with a demonstration of the mind's capacity for truth.,
The progress is ever upwards toward the soul.

Then comes an

analysis of the psychological fact: the mind recognizes above
itself the immutable law of Truth.

So studiously does he

employ the method in this proof--as should be clear from the
account given--that both J. Martin and Descoqs, to name two,
maintain that the argun1ent is rather an analysis of our implicit
knowledge of God than a proper demonstration.

Influenced

perhaps by his Neoplatonic background, Augustine always favored

6
7

De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII, q.54; PL 40, 38.
'J.'" Martin, Saint Au~ustin, lol: "Tout, pour saint Augustin,
se ramene a ce poin fondamental: l'intelligence hunlaine
a primitivement une connaissance de Dieu, totale et tr~s
confuse ••• et, pour ne pas sortir du sujet, elle verifie
que, prouver l'existence de Dieu, c'est percevoir avec
/
' mais trop
quelque clarte/ ce que l•on savait deja,
confusement." - Descoqs, Praelectiones, II, 131: 11 Ainsi
l'existence de Dieu nous est plut8t livree par une analyse
psychologique que par un veritable raisonnement."
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such an approach, an approach as modern as television.
this sort of study he was a master.

And in

Portalie says of him:

Dans l'etude de l'~e, Augustin est plus
heureux que dans son angelologie trop
pen~tree de neoplatonisme.
Ici il semble
vivre dans son domaine: un don exquis
d'observation int~rieure et d'analyse
penE!trante lui ;>ermet de dE!crire avec une
saisissante precision les phenom~nes les
plus d~licats de notre vie intime.8
Some elements in the proof which rise from this background
of Neoplatonism may be indica ted.

1

.L

he most noticeable is the

very principle which Augustine employed.

He asked Evodius:

"Are you willing to admit that God exists if I can prove to
you th&t there exists something superior to the human
intellect?"9

Now this line of attack is directly out of

Plotinus, as Augustine himself says in the De Civitate Dei.
Dicit ergo ille magnus Platonicus, animam
rationalem (sive potius intellectualis
dicenda sit, ex quo genere etiam imrnortalium beatorumque animas esse intelligit,
quos in coelestibus sedibus habitare non
dubitat) non habere supra se naturam nisi
Dei, qui fabrica8us est mundum, a quo et
ipsa facta est.l
Another indication of his philosophical background is

8
9

Portalie, "Saint Augustin," DTC, I, 2356-2357.
De Libero Arbitrio, II, 6, l~PL 32, 1248: "Quid si
iriquid invenire potuerimus, quod non solum esse non dubites,
sed eti~~ ipsa nostra ratione praestantius? dubitabisne
illud quidquid est, Deum dicere?"
10 De Civitate Dei, X, 2; PL 41, 279-280.
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found in his mode of advancing step by step through the various
grades of being.

He wishes to transcend the sensible order,

but in the longest expose of his proof he feels obliged to do
so gradually.

As Boyer and Descoqs remark, once he has traveled

this route, he need not traverse all the steps again.

However,

when he follows the itinerary from start to finish in such a
way that Evodius may follow him, he takes one step at a time
to arrive at the truth above our intellect.

This procedure

through the "degrees of being" may also be called Platonic.
Again, the effort to pass from things to their ideas,
f.rom the sensible to the intelligible, is distinctive of St.
Augustine.

Gilson observes that his normal route is from the

exterior world to the soul, and from the soul to God.ll

One

reason for this is undoubtedly the prominence of ideas in
Platonic and Neoplatonic philosophy.

Another reason is the

fact that Augustine had at one time conceived of God in a
material way, as the Confessiones abundantly testify.

Now he

wishes to prove the spirituality of God by placing him clearly
above the intelligibles.l2

And it may be added that his

concern to ea.tablish the mind's ability. to grasp truth, at the
very outset, grows out of his own Manichaean difficulties.

11
12

Gilson, Introduction, 24: " ••• alors m~me qu' elle part du
monde ext~rieur, ltitin6raire normal d'une preuve augustinienne va done du monde ~ l•Bme et de l'rune a Dieu."
Cf. fhonnard 1 s observation, given in Chapter IV, p. 57.

For
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the Manichaeans denied that man can know anything with
certainty.

These more or less autobiographical marks, then, are

also characteristic.
Something which he did not learn from his early philosophical training, but which he garnered from his own hard

.

experience, is also evident in the proof.

It is the insistence

on faith, coming from belief in authority.
We all remember the chapters of his
Confessions, where Augustine relates how,
after vainly trying to reach truth, and
eventually faith, by means of reason
alone, he had at last discovered that all
the rational truth about God that had been
taught by the philosophers could be grasped
at once, pure of all errors, and enriched
with many a more than philosophical truth
by the simple act of faith of the most
illiterate among the faithful. From that
time on, Augustine was never to forget
that·the safest way to reach truth is not
the one that starts from reason and then
goes on from rational certitude to faith,
but, on the contrary, the way whose
starting point is faith and then goes on
from revelation to reason.l3
Having once learned this lesson, Augustine indeed never
failed to draw profit from it.

He demands faith in the

existence of God before he seeks to prove that fact rationally

13 Etienne Gilson, Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages,
Chas. Scribner's Sons, New York, 1938,-rs:--
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in the De Libero Arbitrio.l4
De~

The whole section which, in the

Religione, precedes the proof is concerned with

establishing the priority of faith on authority and the
reasonableness of faith.l5

Only then does he attempt to prove

by reason what he already knows by faith.

Both the effort to

bring in reason to support faith and the clearly defined
subordination of reason to faith are typical of the great
African Bishop.
To this list, which is not intended to be exhaustive, two
other distinctive marks of the hand of Augustine may be added.
The one is his affective method which culminates in the other,
a great wonder at God \Vho may be enjoyed in mystical contemplation.

The two may be treated together.

As Augustine led Evodius along the path toward God, he
came upon Wisdom.

Wisdom is a part of the proof.

But for

Augustine it is more than a logical step in an argument.

It is

something to be admired and praised and sought.
At illa veritatis et sapientiae pulchritude,
tantum adsit perseverans voluntas fruendi,
nee multitudine audientium constipata

14

15

De Libero Arbitrio, II, 2, 6; PL 32, 1243: n ••• neque
quisquwm inveniendo Deo fit idoneus, nisi antea crediderit
quod est postea cogniturus." Again, Ibid., II, 2, 5; PL 32,
1242: "A. Illud saltern tibi certum es~eum esse. E.
Eti~a hoc non contemplando, sed credendo inconcussum
teneo."
De Vera Religione, chapters 24-28; PL 34, 141-144.
- -

f
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secludit venientes, nee peragitur tempore,
nee migrat locis, nee nocte intercipitur,
nee umbra intercluditur, nee sensibus
corporis subjacet.l6
And again he says: "Ecce tibi est ipsa veritas: amplectere
illam si potes, et fruere illa, et delectare in Domino, et
dabit tibi petitiones cordis tui.nl7
is, above all, Truth.
have given an account.

Now, for Augustine, God

He has said it in the works of which we
He said it often, but nowhere more

clearly than in the De Trinitate: uEcce vide, si potes, o anima
pergravata corpore quod corrumpitur, et onusta terrenis
cogitationibus multis et variis; ecce vide, si potes; Deus
Veritas est.nl8
When we realize this fact, we understand the Saint's
insistence upon embracing the truth.

This grasp of truth may

be only that which is ordinarily permitted to men.
amount to supernatural ecstasy.

It may

Boyer believes that the logical

culmination of the argument was, for Augustine, a mystical
vision of God.l 9

Surely there are texts which bear out the

opinion.
In the De Ordine, after proving the existence of God,

16
17
18
19

De Libero Arbitrio, II, 14, 38; PL 32, '1262.
IOid., II, 13, 35; PL 32, 1260.
ue'Trinitate, VIII, 2, 3; PL 42, 949.
BOyer, Essais, 77-96.
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st. Augustine breaks out into ecstatic praise of Him.

Cum autem se composuerit et·ordinaverit,
ac concinnam pulchramque reddiderit,
audebit jam Deum videre, atque ipsum
fontem unde manat omne verum, ipsumque
Patrem Veritatis. Deus magne, qui erunt
illi oculi l Quam sani, quam decori, quam
valentes, quam constantes, quam sereni,
quam beati J Quid autem est illud quod
vident? quid, quaeso? Quid arbitremur,
quid aestimemus, quid loquamur? Quotidiana
verba occurrunt, et sordidata aunt omnia
vilissimis rebus. Nihil amplius dicam,
nisi promitti nobis aspectum pulchritudinis,
cujus imitatione pulchra cujus comparatione
foeda sunt caetera.20
And the famous passage in the Confessiones, already so often
referred to and quoted, seems to corroborate the opinion that
this last step is ecstasy.21
Furthermore, in the Confessiones and the De Trinitate,
St. Augustine describes what might be a supernatural vision.
It is brief and difficult to retain: "Ecce in ipso primo ictu
quo velut corruscatione perstringeris, cum dicitur Veritas,
mane, si potes.
atque terrena."22

Sed non potes; relaberis in ista solita
It is granted to few, the clean of heart:

Sed et priusquam videamus conspicere atque
percipere Deum, sicut conspici et percipi
potest, quod mundicordibus licet: Beati enim
mundicordes, quia ipsi Deum videbunt; nisi
per fidem diligatur, non poterit cor mundari

20
21
22

De Ordine, II, 19, 61; PL 32, 1019.
COnfessiones, VII, 10, 16; PL 32, 742.
De Trinitate, VIII, 2, 3; PL 42, 949.
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quo ad eum videndum sit aptum et idoneum.23
Possibly it is supernatural ecstasy which is described
in the Confessiones, where St. Augustine describes a special
sort of vision •
••• et venimus in mentes nostras et transcendimus eas, ut attingeremus regionem
ubertatis indeficientis, ubi pascis
Israel in aeternum veritatis pabulo, et
ubi vita sapientia est, per quam fiunt
omnia ista, et quae fuerunt, et quae
futura aunt, et ipsa non fit, sed sic
est ut fuit, et sic erit semper; quin
potius fuisse et futurum esse non est
in ea, sed esse solum, quoniam aeterna
eat; nam fuisse et futurum esse, non est
aeternum. Et dum loquimur et inhiamus
illi, attingimus earn modice toto ictu
cordia.24
We are not concerned here, however, to prove that the
argument for God's existence finds its culmination in ecstasy.
It is enough to have shown that Augustine's method here, as in
all his works, is

~ffective,

that it tends toward union with

that -Which it seeks.
These features of the proof, then, are characteristic of
St. Augustine's style, procedure, and way of thinking: the
discursive nature of the argument, the rhetorical flourishes
in style, the psychological approach to the problem, the

23
24

Ibid., VIII, 4, 6; PL 42, 951.
CO:nfessiones, IX, 10, 24; PL 32, 774.
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indications of a Neoplatonic philosophical background, and
finally the affective method leading to an enjoyment of God,
probably in mystical contemplation.

Thus, as this is "la

demonstration augustinienne par excellence," it is also a proof
typical in every way of St. Augustine's method and manner.

CONCLUSION
The picture would seem to be complete.

But before the

"pin.xit" is affixed in the corner, it might be well to make a
rapid review of the whole process, from the broad sketch to the
detailed drawing, from the critical testing to the appreciation.
First was given a faithful account of St. Augustin6's
proof for the existence of God as he traced it out most fully
in the De Libero Arbitrio.

Then, in order that the route he

took stand out more clearly, that same route was followed in
the De Vera Religione.

Finally, the whole itinerary was gone

over once again, and a master chart, as it were, was compiled
from directions given in several of the Saint's works.
Next was the period of testing.

Here it was first

decided that the proof finally rests upon the principle of
sufficient reason, for the argument ultimately proves the
existence of God as the sole sufficient reason for the immutable
truth which exists above our intellect.

In the fifth chapter,

in answer to the question, "Is the proof ontological?" the
conclusion was reached that it. is ontological, inasmuch as it
seems to involve an illegitimate transfer from the logical to
100
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the real order.

But at the same time it is not ontologistic,

since it does not depend on a direct vision
regard to the connection
doctrine

or

or

or

God.

With

the proor with st. Augustine's

illumination, although it seems clear that the

or

Doctor did not argue rrom this doctrine to the existence

God, and although he did not explicitly use the doctrine in his
proor; nevertheless, the argument does have an essential
dependence on this theory, it it is to be considered a complete
proor.

Finally, the proor is entirely characteristic

Augustine, ror the distinctive marks

or

or

st.

his genius may clearly

be seen throughout it.
This paper may end with the excellent observation which
Gilson makes about the proor:
\

Cette tendance proronde a trouver en Dieu
seul la raison suffisante de l'id~e que nous
avons de lui est le lien qui rattache ~ la
metaphysique
augustinienne celles de saint
"
Anselme, de ·saint Bonaventure, de Duns
S~ot et de Descartes; mais, en u~ sens, la
demonstration qu'il en propose depasse
de beaucoup celles qu 1 elle a inspir6es, car
elle n 1 est ni un argument, ni une suite
d'arguments, mais une metaphysique compl~te,
plus une morale, avec la mystique m~me ~ui
la couronne. Le doute initial, l'appel a
la roi, l'evidence de la pens~e, la spiritualit~ de l'ime et la transcendance de la
~v6rit~, chacun des moments successifs de la
preuve est la traduction d'une experience
personelle qu'il, importe
de m~diter pour
I'
que 1 1 interpretation metaphysique en
devienne intelligible.l

1

Gilson, Introduction, 29

'-.
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